논문KCI 등재
Optimal Taxation Welfare and International Technology Transfer under Market Structure Change
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Abstract
This paper analyzes whether the best technology can be transferred from a foreign market leader to a technologically backward domestic firm when the market competition structure changes from Stackelberg duopoly to Cournot duopoly after the best technology is transferred. We find that the market leader would transfer only less than best technology. Also, we show that the host government must suffer a loss in tax revenue if it is to acquire the best technology.
참고문헌 (11)
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- Shy, O, "Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications" (1995), The MIT Press
- Wang, X. H, "Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Cournot Duopoly Model", 60, pp.55~62 (1998)
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