본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

OPTIMAL INFLATION TARGETS AND THE INFORMATIVENESS OF THE INFLATION RATE

1

조회

0

다운로드

0

인용

0

참고문헌

주제분류경제학

초록

Abstract

In this paper I study the design of inflation targets in a two period model in which the government delegates monetary policy to an instrument independent central banker who has private information that is relevant to monetary policy making. I find that there exists a set of conditions under which the governments and the publics ability to learn about the bankers private information has an effect on the optimal target. More specifically, if different inflation targets convey different information, the government should adjust the inflation target in the direction that increases the informativeness of the inflation rate. Doing so reduces social welfare losses.

참고문헌 (26)

  1. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model Journal of Political Economy", pp.589~610 (1983)
  2. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Bankers Preferences, Journal of Money", 30, pp.384~403 (1998), Credit and Banking
  3. "Journal of Monetary Economics", pp.169~183 (1993)
  4. "Comparison of Experiments In Proceedings of the Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability University of California Press" (1951)
  5. "Equivalent Comparison of Experiments Annals of Mathematical Statistics", pp.265~272 (1953)
  6. "Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference does it Make?" (2002), The Federal Reserve Bank
  7. "Central Bank Transparency in Theory and in Practice", 3639. (2002)
  8. "How Transparent are Central Banks?,", 3188. (2002)
  9. "Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy", 4445 (2004)
  10. "Do Federal Reserve Policy Surprises Reveal Superior Information about the Economy?", pp.1~29 (2004), F
  11. "Key Issues in the Choice of Monetary Policy Framework, in Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context, L. Mahadeva ed.; G. Sterne ed." (2000), Routledge
  12. "Central Bank Transparency", 112, pp.532~565 (2002)
  13. "Information and Experimentation in Short-Term Contracting", 19, pp.311~331 (2002)
  14. "Will the Fed Ever Learn?", 21, pp.279~292 (1999)
  15. "A Bayesian Exposition of Blackwells Theorem on the Comparison of Experiments in Bayesian Models in Economic Theory" (1984)
  16. "The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans Journal of Political Economy", pp.473~491 (1977)
  17. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Inflation Targeting, Federal Reserve Bank of St.", August, pp.86 (2004), 51~80
  18. "Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies Journal of Economic Theory", pp.363~384 (1994)
  19. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?", 108, pp.529~542 (1998)
  20. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target Quarterly Journal of Economics", pp.1169~1189 (1985)
  21. "Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates", 90, pp.429~457 (2000)
  22. "Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty: Walsh-Svensson Non-Equivalence Revisited, CentER for Economic Policy Research", 9811 (1998)
  23. "US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences", 66 (2002)
  24. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule", 43, pp.607~654 (1999)
  25. "Optimal Inflation Targets, Conservative Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts", 87, pp.98~114 (1997)
  26. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers", 85, pp.150~167 (1995)

관련 논문AI추천

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (6건)