Contract Law and the Boundaries of the Firm
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Abstract
This paper develops a simple structural model of the boundariesof the rm to formalize some of the aspects of the Williamso-nian transaction cost economics that are distinct from Grossman,Hart and Moore's formal property rights theory. We build ontwo ideas. First, we employ Williamson's idea that whereas in-terrm transactions may be governed by court-enforced contracts,intrarm transactions are governed by the implicit law of forbear-ance. The application of the forbearance doctrine to internal or-ganization limits the use of incentive contracts within the rm andgives rise to the cost of integration. Second, we incorporate fromthe property rights theory the idea that it is easier to replace anemployee-manager than to replace an independent subcontractor.As a result, some observable but unveriable information can beeectively used in the internal governance of the rm but not inthe governance of contractual interrm relations. This dierenceis identied as the source of the benets of integration.
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