Does cartel leadership facilitate collusion?
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We discuss the implications of a Stackelberg sequence of play between a cartel and the fringe. We consider two different approaches to collusion with quantity competition, a one-stage static model and a multi-period oligopoly model. Our main results are that (i) in the static model a stable cartel only exist when cartel firms behave as a Stackelberg leader, and (ii) that in the supergame approach the cartel is always more easily sustained with the leadership than in the simultaneous-moves game. It is also shown that both results hold with either homogeneous or differentiated products.
Abstract
We discuss the implications of a Stackelberg sequence of play between a cartel and the fringe. We consider two different approaches to collusion with quantity competition, a one-stage static model and a multi-period oligopoly model. Our main results are that (i) in the static model a stable cartel only exist when cartel firms behave as a Stackelberg leader, and (ii) that in the supergame approach the cartel is always more easily sustained with the leadership than in the simultaneous-moves game. It is also shown that both results hold with either homogeneous or differentiated products.
참고문헌 (14)
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