기업의 지배구조가 추징세액에 미치는 영향

Abstract

Managers’ decision making is directly related to corporate value and according to corporate governance, the orientation of managers’ decision making comes to vary. Since such a corporate tax evasion attempt is part of managers’ decision making, it can affect tax evasion acts depending upon corporate governance. This study investigated the effect on the size of additional tax amount according to corporate governance structures. Corporate governance was divided herein into audit agency independence, fair disclosure level and board independence, and corporate governance level in consideration of all these. To examine the effects of corporate governance on the sizes of additional tax amount caused by corporate tax evasion, etc., this study empirically looked into the companies whose additional tax amounts were announced by the Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System from 2002 to 2009. As a result of the empirical research, the followings were found. First, the less independent and less active the audit institutions were, the more incentives the companies had to evade taxes, resulting in a larger amount of penalty taxes. Second, the more unfair or inaccurate the company disclosure data were, or the more inactive they were; the more incentives the companies had to evade taxes, resulting in a larger amount of penalty taxes. Third, the less independent and less active the audit institutions, the more incentives the companies had to evade taxes, resulting in a larger amount of penalty taxes. Lastly, the poorer the overall corporate governance considering all of the audit institutional independence and fair disclosure level and directorate independence, the more incentives the companies had to evade corporate tax, resulting in a larger amount of penalty taxes.