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Corporate Leverage Strategy in an Emerging Market

Peter Cashel-Cordo|Jong C. Rhim|Byung S. Min
사람과세계경영학회 (People&Global Business Association)|2015.12|Global Business and Finance Review|제20권 제2호|pp. 35-48|DOI Http://dx.doi.org/10.17549/gbfr.2015.20.2.35

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키워드

GovernanceChaebolCorporate leverageBoard reform

초록

This study empirically investigates whether the introduction of a new corporate governance system in the Korean economy (where controlling shareholders dominate business groups and corporate-bank relationships are prominent) affects corporate leverage strategies. We find evidence suggesting that improved corporate governance, measured by appointments of outside directors and controlling shareholder’s ownership, constrains corporate borrowing. Chaebol firms, on average, have higher levels of borrowing than stand-alone firms. However, the largest chaebols, who are heavily involved in multinational ventures, showed the opposite trend, ostensibly due to more diversified business opportunities and sources of financing available in international markets. This suggests that government policies designed to improved corporate governance among “average” chaebols may be ineffective (or only partially effective), because such policies do not account the heterogeneity that exists across chaebols. Lastly, we find that intragroup transactions among affiliates increase corporate borrowing, but they are not consistently related to chaebol borrowing as a whole.

Abstract

This study empirically investigates whether the introduction of a new corporate governance system in the Korean economy (where controlling shareholders dominate business groups and corporate-bank relationships are prominent) affects corporate leverage strategies. We find evidence suggesting that improved corporate governance, measured by appointments of outside directors and controlling shareholder’s ownership, constrains corporate borrowing. Chaebol firms, on average, have higher levels of borrowing than stand-alone firms. However, the largest chaebols, who are heavily involved in multinational ventures, showed the opposite trend, ostensibly due to more diversified business opportunities and sources of financing available in international markets. This suggests that government policies designed to improved corporate governance among “average” chaebols may be ineffective (or only partially effective), because such policies do not account the heterogeneity that exists across chaebols. Lastly, we find that intragroup transactions among affiliates increase corporate borrowing, but they are not consistently related to chaebol borrowing as a whole.

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