Political-Institutional Origins of Regulatory Stability: The Case of the U.S. Securities Laws
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Abstract
Chi-wook KimThis article examines the stability of U.S federal securities regulation specifically, disclosure rules and the separation of commercial and investment banking - which significantly affected to the striking success of American stock markets since the Great Depression. In particular, I focus on how the institutional division of power between the executive and the legislature, and within Congress influences the pattern of change in securities regulations. Using the veto players framework which explains the choice of particular policies and the possibility of their change, I argue that a fragmented presidential system with multiple veto players results in regulatory stability. That is, two conditions were met for it. First, there were many veto players in securities legislation. The President's preference over a change of existing securities regulation turned out important. But it could be realized into a concrete legislation only when it was backed by Congress. The lack of either presidential or congressional support prevented any regulatory change from succeeding. Second, the distribution of power and preferences within Congress also mattered. Particularly, Representatives and Senators are elected on the bases of different districts, which implies the existence of different regulatory preferences. Besides the partisan distribution of seats in Congress, such possibility of heterogeneous preferences had important implications for regulatory change. In numerous cases, even when the House and the Senate were controlled by the same political party, members of each chamber tended to reveal different preferences over securities legislation. In sum, these institutional characteristics contributed to regulatory stability in U.S securities markets.
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