주주행동주의 규제를 위한 충실의무 적용에 관한 연구
The Application of the Duty of Loyalty for the Regulation of Activist Shareholders
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Abstract
Generally, U.S. scholars assume that corporate directors and officers are subject to fiduciary duties such as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, while shareholders traditionally have no obligations. Also, they understand that majority shareholder has the duty of loyalty under exceptional circumstances. Recent changes in financial markets, however, have given all shareholders, including minority shareholders great power to pressure managers in order to pursue their own economic benefits at the sacrifice of a corporation and other shareholders. For example, in recent decades, shareholder activism, including increased institutional investors, active hedge funds and green mails, has worked to shift the balance of power from directors and officers to activist shareholders. Activist shareholders can have serious conflicts of interest with a corporation and other shareholders, and they increase inevitable risks of shareholder opportunism. In order to regulate this problem, U.S. courts have applied the duty of loyalty not only to majority shareholders but also to minority shareholders broadly. In Korea, institutional investors and hedge funds are rapidly growing, and they are using their power to seek their own financial benefits. The Korean Commercial Code provides for the duty of loyalty, however, only directors are subject to the duty of loyalty. Therefore, Korean legal scholars have argued that the duty of loyalty should be applied to majority shareholders as well. This article examines U.S. courts’ approaches to the duty of loyalty. Then, it suggests that the duty of loyalty should be applied to all shareholders.
참고문헌 (31)
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