The Effects of Agents’ Competing Interests on Corporate Cash Policy and Cash Holdings Adjustment Speed: The Distribution and Service Industries
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Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder’s ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder’s ownership is positively related to a firm’s cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder’s ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder’s ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners’ sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners’ ability to maximize their personal wealth.
Abstract
Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder’s ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder’s ownership is positively related to a firm’s cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder’s ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder’s ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners’ sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners’ ability to maximize their personal wealth.
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