The Fraud Gone Model and Political Connection - Distribution Approach
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Purpose: This research aims to analyze the influence of greed, opportunity, need, exposes on fraudulence financial reporting by using the distribution of political connections as a moderating variable. Research design, data, methodology: Using data collected from 180 respondents who were leaders involved in financial reports in state-owned companies and manufacturing companies in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Data analysis using SEM PLS. Results: The results of this research show that greed, opportunity, need, exposes, political connections have a significant positive effect on fraudulence financial reporting. Political connection is able to moderate greed, need, exposes to fraudulence financial reporting. Furthermore, political connections are unable to moderate the opportunity for fraudulence financial reporting in company. Conclusion: Greed, opportunities, needs, exposes can influence someone to carry out financial fraud reporting in the company because of internal or external factors that cause someone to commit fraud. Every perpetrator of fraud should be subject to punishment or sanctions if proven to have committed fraud. Political connections can influence fraudulent financial reporting due to the potential for intervention and political pressure that can affect the integrity of financial reporting. Political connections are able to moderate greed, need, exposes against fraudulent financial reporting.
Abstract
Purpose: This research aims to analyze the influence of greed, opportunity, need, exposes on fraudulence financial reporting by using the distribution of political connections as a moderating variable. Research design, data, methodology: Using data collected from 180 respondents who were leaders involved in financial reports in state-owned companies and manufacturing companies in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Data analysis using SEM PLS. Results: The results of this research show that greed, opportunity, need, exposes, political connections have a significant positive effect on fraudulence financial reporting. Political connection is able to moderate greed, need, exposes to fraudulence financial reporting. Furthermore, political connections are unable to moderate the opportunity for fraudulence financial reporting in company. Conclusion: Greed, opportunities, needs, exposes can influence someone to carry out financial fraud reporting in the company because of internal or external factors that cause someone to commit fraud. Every perpetrator of fraud should be subject to punishment or sanctions if proven to have committed fraud. Political connections can influence fraudulent financial reporting due to the potential for intervention and political pressure that can affect the integrity of financial reporting. Political connections are able to moderate greed, need, exposes against fraudulent financial reporting.
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