Neoliberal Paradox? Explaining the Unremitting Corruptions in the Deregulated Korean Economy
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
The recent financial scandal in Korea surrounding savings banks call into question two kinds wisdom we have about corruption: corruption is a result of political rent-seeking, and corruption in East Asia is manageable with the help of the centralized and strong state. Contrary to the expectation that the double advent of democratization and globalization would scale down, if not eradicate, such a political rent-seeking, the recent corruption seen from the scandal has been encompassing the entire regulatory regime. The profile of the corruption was also ugly along with blatant trades between regulatory favors and bribes. This paper defines the Korean scandal as a bureaucratic institutional corruption resulting from the decline of a few management mechanisms occurred throughout the political and economic liberalization during the 1990s. First, the financial scandal is understood in this paper as a policy failure involving misbehaviors while implementing regulatory policies, differently from a generic political failure where policy favors are awarded to selected businesses in return for payments, mostly illegal, at the stage of policy making. It happens with an unsettled economic reform like in Korea where the liberalized financial market meets with a few still highly discretionary government policy agencies. Second, a few fallouts of bureaucratic institutional deterioration or abuse have collectively driven the financial regulatory regimes down to corruption. Most fatal, this study suggests, is the disruption of deferred compensation to policy agents.
Abstract
The recent financial scandal in Korea surrounding savings banks call into question two kinds wisdom we have about corruption: corruption is a result of political rent-seeking, and corruption in East Asia is manageable with the help of the centralized and strong state. Contrary to the expectation that the double advent of democratization and globalization would scale down, if not eradicate, such a political rent-seeking, the recent corruption seen from the scandal has been encompassing the entire regulatory regime. The profile of the corruption was also ugly along with blatant trades between regulatory favors and bribes. This paper defines the Korean scandal as a bureaucratic institutional corruption resulting from the decline of a few management mechanisms occurred throughout the political and economic liberalization during the 1990s. First, the financial scandal is understood in this paper as a policy failure involving misbehaviors while implementing regulatory policies, differently from a generic political failure where policy favors are awarded to selected businesses in return for payments, mostly illegal, at the stage of policy making. It happens with an unsettled economic reform like in Korea where the liberalized financial market meets with a few still highly discretionary government policy agencies. Second, a few fallouts of bureaucratic institutional deterioration or abuse have collectively driven the financial regulatory regimes down to corruption. Most fatal, this study suggests, is the disruption of deferred compensation to policy agents.
참고문헌 (26)
- Aggarwal, Vinod K, "Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving Structures for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations" (2008), Springer
- Amsden, Alice, "Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization" (1989), Oxford University Press
- Amyx, Jennifer, "Japan’s Financial Crisis: Institutional Rigidity and Reluctant Change" (2006), Princeton University Press
- Je ChukEun Hang 5 Dae Jung ChaekSilPaeChaekImGwan Ryo 26 In (26 Responsible Bureaucrats for 5 Policy Failure surrounding Savings Banks), "Cham-Yeo-Yun-Dae", ~ (2013)
- Choi, Byung-sun, "Government Regulations" (2006), Bumoon Sa
- "Chosun Ilbo, various Issues", ~
- Diamond, Larry, "Democracy in East Asia: A New Century" (2013), Johns Hopkins University Press
- Evans, Peter, "Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of ‘Weberian’ State Structure on Economic Growth", American Sociological Review, 64(5), pp.748~765 (1999)
- Grindle, Merilee S, "Thomas. Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries" (1991), Johns Hopkins University Press
- "Joongang Ilbo, various Issues", ~
- Kang, David, "Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines" (2002), Cambridge University Press
- Keohane, Robert, "Internationalization and Domestic Politics" (1996), Cambridge University Press
- 김동열, "The Legacy of Deferred Compensation in Korea’s Administrative Reforms", The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, 27(2), pp.203~218 (2012), 서울대학교행정대학원[DOI]
- Kim, Dongryul, "Bureaucratic Institutions and Economic Reforms: The Effects of Disrupted Post-Retirement Incentive Structures on The Performance of Korean Officials", 박사, pp.2006
- 김홍범, "Financial Reform, Institutional Interdependency and Supervisory Failure in the Post-Crisis Korea", Journal of East Asian Studies, 6(3), pp.409~431 (2006), 동아시아연구원
- Moon, Chung-In, "Democratization and globalization in Korea: Assessments and prospects" (1999), Yonsei University Press
- North, Douglas, "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions" (1990), Cambridge University Press
- Park, Yong-chul, "Financial Development in Korea. Council on East Asian Studies" (1983), Harvard University Press
- Pempel, T. J., "Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region" (2005), Cornell University Press
- Pierson, Paul, "The New Politics of the Welfare State" (2001), Oxford University Press
- Przeworski, Adam, "Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe" (1991), Cambridge University Press
- Rock, Michael, "The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth, and Investment", World Development, 32(6), pp.999~1017 (2004)
- Vogel, Steven, "Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries" (1998), Cornell University Press
- Wade, Robert, "Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in Taiwan’s Industrialization" (1990), Princeton University Press
- Weiss, Linda, "States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In" (2003), Cambridge University Press
- "Yonhap News, November 11, 2011", ~ (2011)