칠레의 패러독스 Pre-피노체트 세력의 신자유주의 발전전략

Abstract

Chile has been an exceptional case in the field of political economy of redemocratization and economic transformation. In Peru and Argentina in the 1980s, for example, redemocratization brought about populist economic policymaking aimed at fulfilling the explosion of expectations from the civil society. However, Chile's transition to democracy in the 1990s did not accompany such an economic turmoil, but maintained the same neoliberalism as the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet had introduced in late 1970s and late 1980s. It was a paradox particularly because the same pre-Pinochet central-leftist and leftist regimes came back in the 1990s to the state power after Pinochet left. This paper attempts to explore the reasons why the pre-Pinochet forces accepted noeoliberalism as their development model, and the way in which they still tried to differentiate their regimes from Pinochet's. As for the former, this paper focuses on the political economy of transition in late 1980s. The pre-Pinochet forces could not freely manage the political dynamics without winning the support of the private sector. The private sector never would trust them unless they accept the “practical” neoliberal development model. Thus the Concertacin had to compromise at the price of their traditionally leftist causes. As for the latter, this paper analyzes the Concertacin's policies in the external and internal fronts. One is concerned with its active negotiation policy for bilateral free trade agreements to further incorporate the interests of the private sector, and the other refers to its substantial programs to improve basic needs conditions for the poor and the underprivileged.