Ambiguity and Performance-Based Lawyer Compensation Contract in Arbitration
1
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
his study explores how institutional ambiguity in arbitration affects performance-based compensation for legal professionals. Using a principal-agent model with ambiguity-averse agents, it finds that uncertainty leads to lower effort, less outcome-sensitive contracts, and reduced expected profits for firms. The findings extend contract theory and offer practical guidance for legal service contracting under uncertain arbitration outcomes.
Abstract
his study explores how institutional ambiguity in arbitration affects performance-based compensation for legal professionals. Using a principal-agent model with ambiguity-averse agents, it finds that uncertainty leads to lower effort, less outcome-sensitive contracts, and reduced expected profits for firms. The findings extend contract theory and offer practical guidance for legal service contracting under uncertain arbitration outcomes.