Practical modeling and quantification of a single-top fire events probabilistic safety assessment model
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In general, an internal fire events probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model is quantified by modifying the pre-existing internal event PSA model. Because many pieces of equipment or cables can be damaged by a fire, a single fire event can lead to multiple internal events PSA initiating events (IEs). Consequently, when the fire events PSA model is quantified, inappropriate minimal cut sets (MCSs), such as duplicate MCSs, may be generated. This paper shows that single quantification of a hypothetical single-top fire event PSA model may generate the following four types of inappropriate MCSs: duplicate MCSs, MCSs subsumed by other MCSs, nonsense MCSs, and MCSs with over-counted fire frequencies. Among the inappropriate MCSs, the nonsense MCSs should be addressed first because they can interfere with the right interpretation of the other MCSs and prevent the resolution of the issues related to the other inappropriate MCSs. In addition, we propose a resolution process for each of the issues caused by these inappropriate MCSs and suggest an overall procedure for resolving them. The results of this study will contribute to the understanding and resolution of the inappropriate MCSs that may appear in the quantification of fire events PSA models
Abstract
In general, an internal fire events probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) model is quantified by modifying the pre-existing internal event PSA model. Because many pieces of equipment or cables can be damaged by a fire, a single fire event can lead to multiple internal events PSA initiating events (IEs). Consequently, when the fire events PSA model is quantified, inappropriate minimal cut sets (MCSs), such as duplicate MCSs, may be generated. This paper shows that single quantification of a hypothetical single-top fire event PSA model may generate the following four types of inappropriate MCSs: duplicate MCSs, MCSs subsumed by other MCSs, nonsense MCSs, and MCSs with over-counted fire frequencies. Among the inappropriate MCSs, the nonsense MCSs should be addressed first because they can interfere with the right interpretation of the other MCSs and prevent the resolution of the issues related to the other inappropriate MCSs. In addition, we propose a resolution process for each of the issues caused by these inappropriate MCSs and suggest an overall procedure for resolving them. The results of this study will contribute to the understanding and resolution of the inappropriate MCSs that may appear in the quantification of fire events PSA models
참고문헌 (14)
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