Sleeping Beauty’s Reflection: In and Out
0
조회
0
다운로드
4
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
What van Fraassen calls ‘Reflection Principle’ is claimed to meet several counterexamples, one of which stands out in the form of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Adam Elga argues that what he believes is the correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem shows that Reflection is subject to counterexamples. David Lewis proposes a different answer which preserves Reflection intact. Recently, Nick Bostrom presents a hybrid view which is supposed to allow us to keep Reflection. In proposing his hybrid view Bostrom criticizes both Elga and Lewis while taking some ‘good’ parts from each. He claims that Elga’s view is not entirely acceptable because it presupposes the ‘Self-Indication Assumption’. I shall claim, however, that Elga could avoid Bostrom’s criticisms by introducing Bostrom’s notion of agent-part. I believe that several probability-related puzzles including the Sleeping Beauty problem indicate a promising view concerning the way we should regard our future selves’ opinions. According to this view, whether one takes the outsider stance or insider stance makes a difference in an important way that one and the same proposition is associated with different degrees of belief by one agent.
Abstract
What van Fraassen calls ‘Reflection Principle’ is claimed to meet several counterexamples, one of which stands out in the form of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Adam Elga argues that what he believes is the correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem shows that Reflection is subject to counterexamples. David Lewis proposes a different answer which preserves Reflection intact. Recently, Nick Bostrom presents a hybrid view which is supposed to allow us to keep Reflection. In proposing his hybrid view Bostrom criticizes both Elga and Lewis while taking some ‘good’ parts from each. He claims that Elga’s view is not entirely acceptable because it presupposes the ‘Self-Indication Assumption’. I shall claim, however, that Elga could avoid Bostrom’s criticisms by introducing Bostrom’s notion of agent-part. I believe that several probability-related puzzles including the Sleeping Beauty problem indicate a promising view concerning the way we should regard our future selves’ opinions. According to this view, whether one takes the outsider stance or insider stance makes a difference in an important way that one and the same proposition is associated with different degrees of belief by one agent.
참고문헌 (22)
- Arntzenius, Frank, "Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection", Journal of Philosophy, 100, pp.356~371 (2003)
- Bar-Hillel, Maya, "Some Teasers Concerning Conditional Probabilities", Cognition, 11, pp.109~122 (1982)
- Bostrom, Nick, "The Mysteries of Self-Locating Belief and Anthropic Reasoning", Harvard Review of Philosophy, 11, pp.59~74 (2003)
- Bostrom, Nick, "Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: a Hybrid View", Synthese, 157, pp.59~78 (2007)
- Christensen, David, "Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs", Philosophical Review, pp.229~247 (1991)
- Dorr, Cian, "Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga", Analysis, 62, pp.292~296 (2002)
- Elga, Adam, "Self‐locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem", Analysis, 60, pp.143~147 (2000)
- Elga, Adam, "Reflection and Disagreement", Noûs, 41, pp.478~502 (2007)
- Gupta, Anil, "Empiricism and Experience" (2006), Oxford University Press
- Hájek, Alan, "The Cable Guy Paradox", Analysis, 65, pp.115~119 (2005)
- Hacking, Ian, "The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy: the Argument from Design. The Anthropic Principle Applied to Wheeler Universes", Mind, 97, pp.331~340 (1987)
- Hacking, Ian, "An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic" (2001), Cambridge University Press
- Leslie, John, "No Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy in Cosmology", Mind, 97, pp.269~272 (1988)
- Lewis, David, "Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga", Analysis, 61, pp.171~176 (2001)
- Maher, Patrick, "Diachronic Rationality", Philosophy of Science, 59, pp.120~141 (1992)
- Perry, John, "The Problem of Essential Indexical Belief", Noûs, 13, pp.3~21 (1979)
- Schervish, M. J., "Stopping to Reflect", Journal of Philosophy, 101, pp.315~322 (2004)
- Talbott, William, "Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology", Philosophical Studies, 62, pp.135~150 (1991)
- van Fraassen, Bas C., "Belief and the Will", Journal of Philosophy, 81, pp.235~256 (1984)
- van Fraassen, Bas C., "Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens", Philosophical Studies, 77, pp.7~37 (1995)
- Walton, Kendall, "Mimesis as Make-Believe" (1990), Harvard University Press
- Weintraub, Ruth, "Sleeping Beauty: A Simple Solution", Analysis, 64, pp.8~10 (2004)