Which Paradox is Genuine in Accordance with the Proof-Theoretic Criterion for Paradoxicality?
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Neil Tennant was the first to propose a proof-theoretic criterion for paradoxicality, a framework in which a paradox, formalized through natural deduction, is derived from an unacceptable conclusion that employs a certain form of id est inferences and generates an infinite reduction sequence. Tennant hypothesized that any derivation in natural deduction that formalizes a genuine paradox would meet this criterion, and he argued that while the liar paradox is genuine, Russell's paradox is not. The present paper delves into Tennant's conjecture for genuine paradoxes and suggests that to validate the conjecture, one of two issues must be addressed. The first issue is the need for a philosophical consensus on the identification of a genuine paradox in an informal sense. The second issue is the requirement for a uniform approach to formalize paradoxes in natural deduction. If either of these issues is addressed, the conjecture could be validated, or at the very least, it could hold philosophical importance in delineating the proof-theoretic features of paradoxicality.
Abstract
Neil Tennant was the first to propose a proof-theoretic criterion for paradoxicality, a framework in which a paradox, formalized through natural deduction, is derived from an unacceptable conclusion that employs a certain form of id est inferences and generates an infinite reduction sequence. Tennant hypothesized that any derivation in natural deduction that formalizes a genuine paradox would meet this criterion, and he argued that while the liar paradox is genuine, Russell's paradox is not. The present paper delves into Tennant's conjecture for genuine paradoxes and suggests that to validate the conjecture, one of two issues must be addressed. The first issue is the need for a philosophical consensus on the identification of a genuine paradox in an informal sense. The second issue is the requirement for a uniform approach to formalize paradoxes in natural deduction. If either of these issues is addressed, the conjecture could be validated, or at the very least, it could hold philosophical importance in delineating the proof-theoretic features of paradoxicality.
참고문헌 (21)
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