네트워크 효과와 제품 차별화를 고려한 호환성 전략
Compatibility Selection of Differentiated Products with Network Effect
0
조회
0
다운로드
3
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
네트워크 효과가 큰 산업에서 호환성의 선택은 기업의 중요한 전략이다. Katz and Shapiro (1985) 이후 호환성에 대해 다양한 연구가 진행되었으나, 수평적으로 차별화된 제품 간 호환성에 대해서는 연구에 따라 엇갈린 결론이 제시되고 있다. 본 연구는 게임이론 모형을 통해 수평적으로 차별화된 제품을 생산하는 기업들이 호환성을 선택할 유인이 있는가, 기업의 호환성 선택은 사회적으로 바람직한가 등의 문제를 고찰한다. 네트워크 효과에 따라 시장 규모가 확대될 수 있도록 일반적인 역수요함수를 사용했다는 점, 호환성과 제품 차별화 간의 상충관계를 명시적으로 고려했다는 점 등이 기존 연구와 차별화되는 부분이다. 분석 결과를 보면, 호환성이 제품 차별화를 크게 감소시킬 것으로 예상되면 기업은 호환성을 선택하지 않는다는 것이고, 이와 같은 기업의 선택은 호환성이 사회적으로 바람직한 상황에서도 나타날 수 있다는 것이다. 비디오 게임기 시장, 국내 모바일 인터넷 시장 등의 실제 사례에서도 이와 같은 사실을 확인할 수 있다.
Abstract
Brands of products are said to be ‘compatible’ if they can work interchangeably, or the output of one brand can be operated or used by the other brands. Though often considered as a technical issue, product compatibility turns out to be one of key strategic decisions in industries exhibiting network effect. Katz and Shapiro (1985) pioneered to examine compatibility decisions between homogeneous products in the presence of network effect. Many authors attempted to extend it into either vertically or horizontally differentiated products. As for vertically differentiated products, it is generally known that a firm producing a low-quality product prefers compatibility, while its rival producing a high-quality product does not. When it comes to horizontal differentiation, however, there is little consensus whether firms have sufficient incentive to pursue compatibility, and their decisions are socially desirable. Using a simple game-theoretic model, I analyze equilibrium production quantities, firms’ incentives toward compatibility, and their welfare consequences. By employing Cournot type competition, I explicitly consider network effect in the analysis. Further, I explicitly concern myself with the trade-off between compatibility and horizontal differentiation. The main conclusions are as follows; first, there exist equilibria where firms select compatibility; second, firms tend to achieve socially insufficient compatibility. Several real world examples including the video game industry and the mobile Internet service industry in Korea support my argument. Previous literature mainly attributed the failure of achieving compatibility to asymmetry between firms (product quality, installed base of customers, etc). However, even symmetric firms may not provide compatibility when compatibility decreases product differentiation. Finally, firms should pay more attention to the characteristics of their products such as the trade-off between compatibility and differentiation when they formulate compatibility strategy.
참고문헌 (13)
- Baake, P, "Vertical product differentiation, network externalities, and compatibility decisions", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, pp.267~284 (2001)
- Belleflamme, P, "Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies" (2010), Cambridge University Press
- Cremer, J, "Connectivity in the commercial Internet", Journal of Industrial Economics, 48(4), pp.433~472 (2000)
- Dixit, A., "A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers", Bell Journal of Economics, 10, pp.20~32 (1979)
- Economides, N., "Desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities", American Economic Review, 79(5), pp.1165~1181 (1989)
- Einhorn, M.A., "Mix and match compatibility with vertical product dimensions", RAND Journal of Economics, 23(4), pp.535~547 (1992)
- Foros, O., "Competition and compatibility among Internet Service Providers", Information Economics and Policy, 13, pp.411~425 (2001)
- Hotelling, H., "Stability in Competition", Economic Journal, 39(153), pp.41~57 (1929)
- Katz, M.L, "Network externalities, competition, and compatibility", American Economic Review, 75(3), pp.424~440 (1985)
- Matutes, C, "Shared ATM networks and banking competition", European Economic Review, 38, pp.1113~1138 (1994)
- Matutes, C, "Mix and match: Product compatibility without network externalities", Rand Journal of Economics, 19(2), pp.221~234 (1988)
- de Palma, A, "Variable willingness to pay for network externalities with strategic standardization decisions", European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp.235~251 (1996)
- Shy, O., "Industrial organization: Theory and applications" (1995), MIT Press