5G Standalone Non-Public Network에서 등록 해제 공격에 대한 분석
Analysis of Deregistration Attacks in 5G Standalone Non-Public Network
0
조회
0
다운로드
3
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
본 논문에서는 5G SNPN (Standalone Non-Public Network)에서 등록 해제 공격(Deregistration Attack)의 가능 여부를 3GPP 표준 문서에 근거하여 분석한다. 등록 해제 공격에서 공격자는 AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function)에 정상적으로 등록되어 있는 UE로 가장하여 스푸핑된RRC (Radio Resource Control) 연결을 설정을 시도하여 AMF가 기존의 UE의 등록을 해제하게 한다. 기존의 등록 해제 공격은 UE가 등록되어 있는 AMF에게 스푸핑된 RRC 연결을 시도하는데, 본 논문에서는 추가적으로, 사용자가 등록 되어 있는 AMF와는 다른 새로운 AMF에게 공격자가스푸핑된 RRC 연결 설정을 시도하였을 때에도, 등록 해제 공격이 가능한지 분석한다. 분석 결과, 5G 이동통신 네트워크 시스템이 3GPP 표준을 충실히 준수하여 구현된 경우에는 UE의 등록 해제공격은 불가능한 것으로 판단된다.
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the possibility of deregistration attack in 5G SNPN (Standalone Non-Public Network) based on 3GPP standard document. In the deregistraion attack, the attacker pretends to be a UE that is normally registered with AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) and attempts to establish a spoofed RRC (Radio Resource Control) connection, causing AMF to deregister the existing UE. The existing deregistration attack attempts a spoofed RRC connection to the AMF in which the UE is registered. In addition, this paper analyzes whether deregistration attack is possible even when an attacker attempts to establish a spoofed RRC connection to a new AMF that is different from the registered AMF. When the 5G mobile communication network system is implemented by faithfully complying with the 3GPP standard, it is determined that a deregistration attack of a UE is impossible.
참고문헌 (13)
- Mamta Agiwal, "Next Generation 5G Wireless Networks: A Comprehensive Survey", IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 18(3), pp.1617~1655 (2016), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)[DOI]
- Martin Wollschlaeger, "The Future of Industrial Communication: Automation Networks in the Era of the Internet of Things and Industry 4.0", IEEE Industrial Electronics Magazine, 11(1), pp.17~27 (2017), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)[DOI]
- Rabia Khan, "A Survey on Security and Privacy of 5G Technologies: Potential Solutions, Recent Advancements, and Future Directions", IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 22(1), pp.196~248 (2020), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)[DOI]
- "3GPP TS 22.261 v16.11.0: “Service Requirements for the 5G System; Stage 1,” March 2020", ~ (2020)
- H. Kim, "Touching the Untouchables:Dynamic Security Analysis of the LTE Control Plane", Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp.1153~1168 (2019)
- S. R. Hussain, "LTEInspector: A Systematic Approach for Adversarial Testing of 4G LTE", Proc. 25th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pp.18~21 (2018), NDSS
- D. Basin, "A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication", Proc. the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’18), pp.1383~1396 (2018)
- C. Cremers, "Component-Based Formal Analysis of 5G-AKA : Channel Assumptions and Session Confusion", Proc. 26th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pp.24~27 (2019), NDSS
- S.R. Hussain, "5GReasoner: A Property-Directed Security and Privacy Analysis Framework for 5G Cellular Network Protocol", Proc. 2019ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp.669~684 (2019)
- "5G-ACIA White Paper: “5G Non-Public Networks for Industrial Scenarios,” July 2019", ~ (2019)
- 박태근, "Security Threats and Potential Security Requirements in 5G Non-Public Networks for Industrial Applications", 한국컴퓨터정보학회논문지, 25(11), pp.105~114 (2020), 한국컴퓨터정보학회[DOI]
- "3GPP. TS 24.501 v16.7.0: “Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3,” Dec. 2020", ~ (2020)
- "3GPP. TS 23.502 v16.8.0: “Procedures for the 5G System (5GS);Stage 2,” Mar. 2021", ~ (2021)