진동 신호를 사용한 MEMS 센서 대상 신호오류 주입공격 탐지 방법
Vibration-Based Signal-Injection Attack Detection on MEMS Sensor
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초록
무인이동체에 탑재되는 자율주행 시스템은 여러 센서를 통해 외부 환경을 인식하고 이를 통해 최적의 제어값을 도출한다. 무인이동체의 자율주행 시스템은 최근들어 사이버공격의 타겟이 되고 있다. 예를 들어, 무인이동체의 센서를 대상으로 신호오류 주입공격을 수행함으로써 센서 데이터를 악의적으로 조작하는 PHY 레벨 (Physical level) 공격과 관련한 연구 결과들이 발표되고 있다. PHY 레벨에서 수행되는 신호오류 주입공격은 주변 환경에 물리적 조작을 가하여 센서가 잘못된 데이터를 측정하게 하므로 소프트웨어 레벨에서 공격을 탐지하기 어렵다는 특징을 갖고 있다. 신호오류 주입공격을 탐지하기 위해서는 센서가 측정하는 데이터의 신뢰성을 검증하는 과정이 필요하다. 현재까지 자율주행 시스템에 탑재되는 센서들을 대상으로 PHY 레벨 공격을 시도하는 다양한 방법이 제시되었으나 이를 탐지하고 방어하는 연구는 아직까지는 부족한 상황이다. 본 논문에서는 무인이동체 환경에서 널리 쓰이고 있는 MEMS 방식의 센서를 대상으로 신호오류 주입공격을 재연하고, 이러한 공격을 탐지하는 방법을 제안한다. 제안하는 방법의 정확도를 분석하기 위해서 신호오류 주입 탐지 모델을 구축하였으며, 실험실 환경에서 유효성을 검증하였다.
Abstract
The autonomous driving system mounted on the unmanned vehicle recognizes the external environment through several sensors and derives the optimum control value through it. Recently, studies on physical level attacks that maliciously manipulate sensor data by performing signal-injection attacks have been published. signal-injection attacks are performed at the physical level and are difficult to detect at the software level because the sensor measures erroneous data by applying physical manipulations to the surrounding environment. In order to detect a signal-injection attack, it is necessary to verify the dependability of the data measured by the sensor. As so far, various methods have been proposed to attempt physical level attacks against sensors mounted on autonomous driving systems. However, it is still insufficient that methods for defending and detecting the physical level attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate signal-injection attacks targeting MEMS sensors that are widely used in unmanned vehicles, and propose a method to detect the attack. We present a signal-injection detection model to analyze the accuracy of the proposed method, and verify its effectiveness in a laboratory environment.
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