Observability of Private Assets in A Dynamic Common-Pool Problem: A Note
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This paper analyzes a multiple-agent economy where each agent can access the common and private capital stocks but not others’ private capital. Relaxing the assumption imposed in the models of Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999), the paper treats general linear Markov strategies for consumption and appropriation. Considering the situation in which each agent can observe and is interested in the opponents’ private capital stocks, the paper finds a new equilibrium candidate. However, since this candidate does not have subgame perfectness, it is shown that the Markov perfect equilibrium obtained in the previous literature is unique.
Abstract
This paper analyzes a multiple-agent economy where each agent can access the common and private capital stocks but not others’ private capital. Relaxing the assumption imposed in the models of Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Tornell and Lane (1999), the paper treats general linear Markov strategies for consumption and appropriation. Considering the situation in which each agent can observe and is interested in the opponents’ private capital stocks, the paper finds a new equilibrium candidate. However, since this candidate does not have subgame perfectness, it is shown that the Markov perfect equilibrium obtained in the previous literature is unique.