하트(H.L.A. Hart)와 라즈(Joseph Raz)의 법철학

Abstract

This paper aims at listening to various sounds which have come from the camp of analytical jurists, through sketching out the philosophies of Hart and Raz, his student and his fellow scholar. The summary of this sketch is as follows. First, the general theory of practical reason has been pursued by Raz independently of Hart's methodology (“ordinary language analysis”). Hart have had a minor, if any, influence on Raz in this matter. Second, Raz has picked up the baton from the core of Hart's jurisprudence. Raz has been one of the most ardent defenders of anti-reductivism, the conception of law as a system of rules and the conception of authority as an essential feature of law. Third, Raz challenges some theories of Hart such as the political theory of “fair play” thesis and the jurisprudence of inclusive legal positivism. It has been often said that Raz continues Hart's criticism of J. Bentham and J. Austin and his debate with Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin. But, as this paper shows, there are not a few differences between the voices of Hart and Raz.