최한기 경험주의적 윤리설의 한계와 형이상학적 정당화

Abstract

Choe Hangi’s philosophy is generally classified as “empiricism,” but it is also characterized by “metaphysical elements.” The starting point of this paper is the fact that these two facets of Choe Hangi’s philosophy made their appearance at different periods of time. Whereas empiricist viewpoints prevailed in his earlier works, a metaphysical system came into view in his later works. This paper explains this change as his attempt to compensate for the insufficiency of his earlier empiricist philosophy in providing an ethical framework by establishing a metaphysical system. In Gicheukcheui, Choe Hangi proposes a scientific methodology of chucheuk(推測). This methodology, useful as it may be in exploring nature, has limitations in explaining ethics due to the fact that conclusions drawn by an empirical procedure inevitably have only relative truth values. In Gihak, he assumes that the universal principle of unhwa-liand establishes a metaphysical system of sadeungunhwa. Theoretically, moral values should be derived from unhwa-li and daegi-unhwa; however, Choe Hangi adopts an approach to justifying the conclusions drawn by an empirical procedure via the metaphysical system. In that way values are justified, and the governance standards are endowed with a more absolute status. From these observations, it can be inferred that the two facets of Choe Hangi’s philosophy, empiricism and metaphysical elements, originate from his pursuit of empirical methodology while securing the absolute primacy of moral values.