Congressional Control of Bureaucracy in the United States: Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Control Mechanisms
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The U.S. Congress has been known to effectively control the bureaucracy. On one hand, Congress adjusts the degree of discretion provided to the bureaucracy when making agencies or legislation: ex ante control. On the other hand, it also performs the oversight activities to punish or correct undesirable behaviors of bureaucrats: ex post control. While the dynamics of each control mechanism is widely examined theoretically, few have attempted to empirically investigate this with a special attention to partisan politics in Congress. I attempt to fill this gap by measuring the two types of control mechanisms, testing theoretical assertions, and analyzing the dynamics under the two control mechanisms.
Abstract
The U.S. Congress has been known to effectively control the bureaucracy. On one hand, Congress adjusts the degree of discretion provided to the bureaucracy when making agencies or legislation: ex ante control. On the other hand, it also performs the oversight activities to punish or correct undesirable behaviors of bureaucrats: ex post control. While the dynamics of each control mechanism is widely examined theoretically, few have attempted to empirically investigate this with a special attention to partisan politics in Congress. I attempt to fill this gap by measuring the two types of control mechanisms, testing theoretical assertions, and analyzing the dynamics under the two control mechanisms.
참고문헌 (31)
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