이동통신 시장의 요금경쟁과 단말기 보조금 경쟁

Abstract

We analyse the effect of handset subsidy regulation in the mobile telephony service market. We assume that two MNOs compete for two consumer groups; the consumers who belong to one group need new handsets but the other consumers do not. The MNOs can offer handset subsidy to the consumers who need new handset unless handset subsidy is not banned but cannot discriminate tariff between two groups. We show that if handset subsidy is banned, the tariff, the profits, and the consumer spending for the service usage and new handset decrease. The consumer surplus from consuming mobile telephony does not change but the overall consumer surplus increases because the decrease of the consumer spending increases the budget for the composite goods. Therefore, the regulator who weighs consumer surplus more than profits needs to consider regulating handset subsidy and promote price competition in mobile telephony service market.