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Deterrence and Stability for the Korean Peninsula

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Most trends on the Korean Peninsula favor South Korea, but North Korea’s nuclearprogram is a great concern, as is the possibility that the North will become desperateat some point because of negative trends. Although unlikely, war—even limitednuclear war—is imaginable in the years ahead, perhaps with winners and losers. Thisposes challenges for strategic planning. RAND and KIDA have been conductinga collaborative research addressing this issue and this paper is the output of thefirst year’s research. The first section of this paper reviews and extends strategic theory and lessonsfrom the Cold War by drawing on classic papers and more recent literature, theprincipal author’s experiences with U.S. strategic planning, recently declassifiedmaterials, history, and psychological research. This is followed by a section thatoutlines the challenges for deterrence salient to Korea today, particularly ways inwhich deterrence could fail, using historical cases. The final section discussesimplications for Korea, highlighting the need to think through how South Koreashould consider its new military capabilities and the need to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence. Complacency regarding both matters would be dangerous. Deterrence could fail for such reasons as misperceptions, misunderstanding theadversary, other aspects of limited rationality, and accidents. Further, the challengesfor extended deterrence are much greater than earlier, as are those in achievingbalance in planning.

Abstract

Most trends on the Korean Peninsula favor South Korea, but North Korea’s nuclearprogram is a great concern, as is the possibility that the North will become desperateat some point because of negative trends. Although unlikely, war—even limitednuclear war—is imaginable in the years ahead, perhaps with winners and losers. Thisposes challenges for strategic planning. RAND and KIDA have been conductinga collaborative research addressing this issue and this paper is the output of thefirst year’s research. The first section of this paper reviews and extends strategic theory and lessonsfrom the Cold War by drawing on classic papers and more recent literature, theprincipal author’s experiences with U.S. strategic planning, recently declassifiedmaterials, history, and psychological research. This is followed by a section thatoutlines the challenges for deterrence salient to Korea today, particularly ways inwhich deterrence could fail, using historical cases. The final section discussesimplications for Korea, highlighting the need to think through how South Koreashould consider its new military capabilities and the need to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence. Complacency regarding both matters would be dangerous. Deterrence could fail for such reasons as misperceptions, misunderstanding theadversary, other aspects of limited rationality, and accidents. Further, the challengesfor extended deterrence are much greater than earlier, as are those in achievingbalance in planning.

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