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Russia’s Priorities and Approaches to Issues Regarding the Korean Peninsula

Alexander Lukin|Oksana Pugacheva
한국국방연구원 (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses)|2022.03|The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis|제34권 제1호|pp. 81-99|DOI 10.22883/kjda.2022.34.1.005

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South KoreaRussiadenuclearizationrelationsDPRK

초록

Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula has occupied an important place in Russia’s foreign policy strategy, due both to its geographical proximity to Russia’s Far Eastern borders and to its geopolitical role. The circumstances on the Korean Peninsula have a direct influence on the security of Russia’s Far East and North– East Asia (NEA) as a whole, making the Peninsula naturally one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities. Officially and unofficially, Russia has two underlying interests in the Korean Peninsula, as stated repeatedly by Russian officials. Firstly, Russia has no interest in seeing weapons of mass destruction appear anywhere in the world, least of all on its borders. Consequently, Russia has consistently taken the position that international nuclear non-proliferation should be preserved, including preventing the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Secondly, Russia is worried about an outbreak of hostilities in Korea. There are reasons for this. Such a war would be a genuine catastrophe near Russia’s borders, replete with radioactive contamination of the area and movement of refugees to the Russian Far East, and it would complicate severely the implementation of Russia’s development strategy for its Far Eastern regions. Consequently, Moscow is, instead, interested in maintaining peace, stability and an atmosphere of cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in NEA, which would provide an environment conducive to developing Russia’s economy. Russia is interested more than anyone else in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and resolving the problems of the Peninsula, including the nuclear issue, by exclusively peaceful political and diplomatic means, whilst respecting the sovereignty and interests of all states involved.

Abstract

Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula has occupied an important place in Russia’s foreign policy strategy, due both to its geographical proximity to Russia’s Far Eastern borders and to its geopolitical role. The circumstances on the Korean Peninsula have a direct influence on the security of Russia’s Far East and North– East Asia (NEA) as a whole, making the Peninsula naturally one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities. Officially and unofficially, Russia has two underlying interests in the Korean Peninsula, as stated repeatedly by Russian officials. Firstly, Russia has no interest in seeing weapons of mass destruction appear anywhere in the world, least of all on its borders. Consequently, Russia has consistently taken the position that international nuclear non-proliferation should be preserved, including preventing the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Secondly, Russia is worried about an outbreak of hostilities in Korea. There are reasons for this. Such a war would be a genuine catastrophe near Russia’s borders, replete with radioactive contamination of the area and movement of refugees to the Russian Far East, and it would complicate severely the implementation of Russia’s development strategy for its Far Eastern regions. Consequently, Moscow is, instead, interested in maintaining peace, stability and an atmosphere of cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in NEA, which would provide an environment conducive to developing Russia’s economy. Russia is interested more than anyone else in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and resolving the problems of the Peninsula, including the nuclear issue, by exclusively peaceful political and diplomatic means, whilst respecting the sovereignty and interests of all states involved.

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