Stressing the Alliance: The United States and the ROK in a Conflict with China over Taiwan
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United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) leaders have tried to manage their respective approaches to China to avoid creating problems in bilateral relations and in the U.S.–ROK alliance. U.S. policymakers have been careful not to place Seoul in the position of having to choose between Washington and Beijing. However, a U.S. military conflict with China would bring differences in U.S. and ROK interests to the fore and force South Korean leaders to make tough choices in response to U.S. requests for diplomatic, economic, and military support. This paper considers what types of diplomatic and economic support the United States might expect from the ROK in the event of a U.S.–China conflict over Taiwan. It then examines potential U.S. requests for military support from the ROK in three scenarios: 1) a PRC joint firestrike campaign intended to inflict sufficient damage to compel Taiwan to negotiate its political status with Beijing; 2) a PRC joint blockade intended to inflict sufficient damage to Taiwan’s economy to compel negotiations; and 3) a joint island landing campaign intended to seize Taiwan and bring it under PRC control. Each involves a different type of military conflict, a different projected duration, and different military demands.
Abstract
United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) leaders have tried to manage their respective approaches to China to avoid creating problems in bilateral relations and in the U.S.–ROK alliance. U.S. policymakers have been careful not to place Seoul in the position of having to choose between Washington and Beijing. However, a U.S. military conflict with China would bring differences in U.S. and ROK interests to the fore and force South Korean leaders to make tough choices in response to U.S. requests for diplomatic, economic, and military support. This paper considers what types of diplomatic and economic support the United States might expect from the ROK in the event of a U.S.–China conflict over Taiwan. It then examines potential U.S. requests for military support from the ROK in three scenarios: 1) a PRC joint firestrike campaign intended to inflict sufficient damage to compel Taiwan to negotiate its political status with Beijing; 2) a PRC joint blockade intended to inflict sufficient damage to Taiwan’s economy to compel negotiations; and 3) a joint island landing campaign intended to seize Taiwan and bring it under PRC control. Each involves a different type of military conflict, a different projected duration, and different military demands.
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