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한국기업의 지배구조 개혁과 자사주 매입 -제도화 이론의 관점-

Governance Reform and Stock Repurchase in Korean Firms: Institution Theory Perspective

김주태
한국기업경영학회 (Korean Corporation Management Association)|2010.09|기업경영연구 (Korean Corporation Management Review)|제17권 제3호|pp. 225-243

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참고문헌

키워드

기업지배구조Corporate GovernanceInstitution TheoryStock Repurchase제도화 이론매입주주중시의 경영
주제분류경영학

초록

한국에서의 기업지배구조 개혁은 일반적으로 1997년의 외환위기 이후에 본격적으로 진행되었다.이때에 행해진 압력은 IMF로부터의 권고사항과 금융시장과 상품시장의 글로벌화의 추세에서 비롯된 것이며, 이런 맥락에서 한국기업에는 주주가치를 중시하는 경영시스템이 많이 소개되었다. 본 논문은 자사주 매입과 같은 주주가치 중시의 경영이 외부로부터 도입될 때 내부의 주요 조직인자(actor)들이 어떻게 반응하는가를 분석하고자 한다. 본 논문에서는 외부로부터 새로운 제도의 도입이 이루어졌을 경우, 회사 내부의 정치적 관계에 따라 이 새로운 시스템을 받아들일 수도 있고, 거부할 수도 있다는 것을 보여주고자 한다. 자사주 매입과 같은 지배구조 개혁이나 주주중시 경영의 도입은 기존의 내부인자들의 권력구조를 변형시킬 수있으므로, 내부 인자들은 이 새로운 제도에 대하여 협조하거나, 거부할 수도 있다는 것이다. 새로운 경영시스템이 그대로 받아들여지거나, 변형되거나, 아니면 거부되는 것은 관계된 회사 내부의 인자들이 어떤 영향을 받고, 이들이 얼마만한 힘을 가지고 있고, 새로운 제도의 확산에 얼마나 관여하는가에 있을 수 있다. 외환위기 이후 한국 기업에 새로이 도입된 앵글로 아메리칸식의 기업지배구조는 받아들이는 기업 내부에서 다양한 사람들에게, 다양한 영향을 미칠 수 있었을 것이다. 이상의 개념을 바탕으로 제도화 이론의 관점에서 모델을 도출하였는데, 지배주주, 기관투자자, 외국인 투자자, 그리고 사외이사를 주주중시 경영의 도입의 압력에반응하는 내부 인자로, 즉 독립변수로서 고려하였다. 실증분석의 결과 지배주주는 주주중시 경영으로서 자사주 매입의 행위에 대하여 반대의 입장을 보여주는 것으로 나타났으며, 기관투자자, 외국인 투자자, 그리고,사외이사는 이에 대하여 지지하는 관계를 보여주었다. 본 논문의 가장 큰 공헌점은 지배구조 개혁에 대하여기존의 대리인 이론의 관점이 아닌, 사회적 맥락에서 제도화 이론의 관점에서 접근했다는 것이다

Abstract

Corporate governance reforms in Korea were taken seriously after the Asian currency crisis of 1997. Recommendations by the International Monetary Fund and changes in the global financial and product markets precipitated the adoption of shareholder value oriented management practices by Korean firms. This paper shows the possible contest among firm actors over the idea of adopting one such shareholder value management practice namely share repurchase. This paper adopted institution theory to explain the governance reform process in Korea. This is a major contribution of this paper,because the most studies about corporate governance have been performed based on agency theory. The overall argument in this paper is that local politics (at firm level), reacting to external pressures,drive the adoption or rejection of management innovations (e.g., stock repurchase) from an alternative governance system, as local actors co-opt or dismiss Anglo-American corporate governance to reframe existing interests. Whether these management innovations get adopted, translated or rejected depends on the power, interests and value commitment of the firm-level actors. As such Anglo-American corporate governance provides a broad toolbox from which actors select different elements to craft their frames that suit their interests. In this background, we considered four independent variables representing influencial actors to external pressure to adopt new management practice. Treating controlling shareholders, foreign shareholders,institutional shareholders and outside directors as organizational actors and employing a variant of the neo-institutional lens, hypotheses were derived. We proposed a negative relationship between controlling shareholder and the adoption of stock repurchase and a positive relationship betwenn other three variables and stock repurchase. The findings show that controlling shareholders in Korea resisted stock repurchase. On the other hand institutional and foreign investors as well as outside/independent directors were in favor of stock repurchase. This paper explained corporate governance reform process in Korea from sociological viewpoint. All organizations are embedded in society and understanding the interaction between the organization and environment is critical to explain the changes in organization. This paper also shows the institutional transition process in Korea after the currency crisis. Since the currncy crisis in 1997, there have been many studies about institutional transition in emerging economies like China or Korea.

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