도시개발사업의 공공성 강화

Abstract

The key to strengthening the publicity of private-participating urban development projects is the return of betterment. First, the basis law for urban development projects, which requires reinforcement of publicity, is reviewed in its historical context. To define the scope of restitution in the betterment of private project implementers, the definition of betterment is also reviewed. In addition, the Daejang-dong development project, which served as an example for strengthening publicity, and the progress towards the recovery of betterment were reviewed. Legislation has been proposed several times to improve the controversial Restitution of Development Gains Act. However, because of the standing committee’s review, the Urban Development Act and the Housing Act were proposed as alternatives to the National Assembly’s Land, Infrastructure and Transport Committee, and passed the original bill at the plenary session on December 9, 2021. The main point of the bill is to reset to when it was enacted and raise the development burden rate to 40-50% under the Restitution of Development Gains Act. However, political views on this were conflicting and failed to cross the threshold of the standing committee. The burden rate should be determined in consideration of the view of how much the private project implementer contributes to public welfare and the reality of the imposition criteria. The upper limit of the profit rate of private participants under the Urban Development Act was adopted as an alternative to the standing committee to be prescribed by Presidential Decree in consideration of the characteristics of the project and the degree of contribution of private participants. These revisions strengthen the involvement of designated persons in the limitation of the profit rate of private businesses and the creation land supply plan. Above all, the core of the controversy over the Daejang-dong development project stems from the method of supplying land created by competitive bidding, lottery, and private contracts, and conclusively the amendment does not contain the control of the designated authority. In this fashion, legislators cannot implement it even after learning of it. However, when a private participant intends to directly use the created land, etc., it is stipulated that the created land, etc., can only be used within the scope of the private participant’s investment stake among the total created land. It is expected that this regulation will act as an incentive clause to induce private participation, and at the same time, it will be a control law against the abuse of authority by designated persons. With the revision of the Housing Act, the ceiling on the sale price of apartments created by a corporation that has invested more than fifty percent of the proportion is considered a public housing site. This prevents private project implementers from earning excessive profits. Expectations for strengthening publicity and concerns over shrinking housing supply coexist with the reorganization of the betterment return legislation for private-participating urban development projects. Several other unfortunate legal issues are also reviewed.