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주주보호를 심각하게 고려하는가?: 미국과 독일의 기업지배구조

TAKING SHAREHODER PROTECTION SERIOUSLY?: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

서정|Theodor Baum|Kenneth E. Scott
한국증권법학회 (Korea Securities Law Association)|2007.06|증권법연구 (The Korean Journal of Securities Law)|제8권 제1호|pp. 373-426

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키워드

company law (United StatesGermany)corporate governance (United States
주제분류법학

초록

The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design - if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country legal system, would require.

Abstract

The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design - if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country legal system, would require.

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