내부자거래와 이해상충 통제 및 관리수단으로서의Chinese Wall의 法的 機能에 관한 연구 - 영미에서의 운용과 자본시장법상의 기준에 대한비교검토를 중심으로 -
A Study on Chinese Wall as Legal Protection andDefense against Insider Trading and Conflict of Interest
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2009년 자본시장법의 시행으로 국내 금융기관은 물론 규제당국도 각종 금융업의 겸영이 허용된 대규모 금융그룹의 출현으로 새로운 국면을 맞이하였다. Chinese Wall은 이해상충(Conflict of Interests)과 내부자거래(Insider Trading)가 발생할 수 있는 상황하에서 이를 방지하거나 적절하게 처리할 수 있도록 할 뿐 아니라, 대금융그룹내 계열사간 또는 금융회사내 부서간에 이러한 고충 없이 자유롭게 업무를 영위할 수 있도록 해준다. 물론 Chinese Wall의 설치만으로 관련 책임이 완벽하게 면제되는 것은 아니나 본고에서 논증하였듯이, 적절한 설치 및 각종 절차의 준수로서 금융회사에 대한 책임 추궁의 가능성이 낮아지거나 면책된다고 할 수 있을 것이다. 금융투자회사들은 겸영에 따른 문제를 해결하기 위해 이해상충과 관련된 원칙을 세우고 관련규정을 지속적으로 정비해야 함은 물론이다. 한편 규제 및 감독당국에서는 겸영 전환에 따른 초기의 혼선에 대비하여 비조치의견(No Action Letter)제도를 활성화하고, 자율규제기관인 협회내 이해상충 판단위원회 설치, 운영 등을 통하여 금융계에서의 이해상충 관련 문제의식을 제고하고 예방과 해소방법에 관련하여 업계 내에서의 공감대를 형성하는 등의 방안을 진지하게 검토해야 할 것이라고 본다. 구체적으로 금융회사측에서는 이해상충이나 내부자거래가 발생할 소지가 있는 상황하에서 적절한 Chinese Wall이 설치되어 있고, 절차와 방식을 준수하여 정상적으로 작동되었고 절차와 방식의 위반사항이 발생하지 않았음을 들어 당해 회사의 영업행위의 정당성을 옹호(Defend)할 수 있는 중요한 기전(Safe Harbor)으로 작용할 것이라는 점이다. 이는 이해상충, 내부자거래 등의 이익충돌 상황에서 이를 관리(manage)하고 통제(control)하는 장치이기도 하며 이러한 Chinese Wall의 존재 및 설치를 입증함으로써 당해 금융회사는 Chinese Wall의 부존재나 적절한 처리 및 해소, 혹은 절차위반사항이 증명되지 않는다면 이해상충의 책임에서 면책됨을 의미하는 것이기도 하다. 또한, 금융감독기관측에서도 규제 및 감독업무를 수행함에 있어, 기본적으로 Chinese Wall의 설치와 관련 절차의 준수 여부를 확인함으로써 해당 금융회사가 이해상충예방 및 해소의무를 적절히 수행하였는지 판단할 수 있을 뿐 아니라 각종 규제조치를 가할 수 있게 되는 것이다. 결과적으로는 자본시장법이 목표하듯이 금융투자자 내지 의뢰인측에서도 이러한 장치 및 제도를 통해 이해상충이나 내부자거래 등의 이익충돌 상황에서 최적의 상태로 보호 받게 되는 것이다.
Abstract
Chinese Wall policies and procedures have been a concrete regulatory requirement for the US brokerᐨdealers pursuant to the strengthened requirements of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“ITSFEA”). ITSFEA specifically requires that all brokerᐨdealers to establish, maintain, and enforce written procedures reasonably to prevent misuse of material, non public information by employees and proprietary accounts. Main purpose of Chinese Wall policies and procedures as mandated by the US regulators is to prevent insider trading and to provide a means by which financial firms can identify, manage or control actual and potential conflicts of interest among clients or among clients and the financial firm in question. Today Chinese Wall policies and procedures have been widely adopted by global financial firms, including brokerᐨdealers, investment banks, commercial banks, bankᐨholding companies and financial conglomerates that provide multiple services to multitudinous clients (both corporate and retail) as well as engaging in their own proprietary trading activities. Financial firms routinely come to possess insider or confidential information (“Inside Information”) concerning their clients or related parties in the course of providing financial services to their clients. Financial firms owe several legal obligations to their clients, namely duty to refrain from insider trading, duty to use confidential information received from the clients only for the clients’ benefit, duty to provide the clients with recommendations or investment decisions based upon the best available information, among others. Most of all, financial firms have duty not to use the information to further their own interests or the interests of their other clients. In practice, Chinese Wall serves to allow financial firms to provide services (“Private Side Services”) that necessarily involve exposure to, use of, or creation of, Inside Information while contemporaneously engaging in services that require the same financial firms to operate in the public financial markets (“Public Side Services”). Public Side Services are those services that not only do not require Inside Information, but also those services that may not be performed if the firm is in possession of Inside Information. This result of the financial firms being able to provide concurrently the Private Side Services and Public Side Services is achieved by allowing Inside Information possessed by a financial firm only to those individuals or groups (“Private Side”) within the financial firm that legitimately need it to provide Private Side Services, thereby making it inaccessible to those providing Public Side Services (“Public Side”). Specifically, Private Side Services refer to investment banking, capital markets and corporate advisory services provided to corporate clients. They include provision of corporate loans, financing or advising on tender offers, leveraged buyᐨouts, and going private transactions, private placements and mergers and acquisitions. Public Side Services refer to brokerage, sales trading, investment management or investment advisory services, provision of research reports on listed companies, and proprietary trading. In theory, without a Chinese Wall separating the Private Side from the Public Side of a financial firm, the presumption is that the firm may not engage in Public Side Services in respect of the securities which are subject of or related to transactions undertaken by the Private Side. The rationale for this is that the firm’s Private Side’s knowledge of the Inside Information concerning these securities would be imputed to the Public Side of the firm, thereby rendering any trading in, sales or solicitation or investment recommendation of the same securities by the Public Side of the firm insider trading which is illegal. However, a robustly erected and tightly implemented Chinese Wall would allow a financial firm the ability to assert that the Public Side of the firm does not have any Inside Information that is in possession by the Private Side of the firm, unless the party claiming insider trading on the part of the firm is able to prove that, notwithstanding the Chinese Wall, employees on the Public Side actually have access to Inside Information. As can be inferred from the foregoing, Chinese Wall imparts substantial benefits to the financial firms that adopt and administer it by allowing them an effective means to protect, if not legally defend, themselves against insider trading, breach of client confidentiality and conflicts of interest claims. The circumstances that gave rise to the adoption of and reliance on the Chinese Wall policies by the regulators, selfᐨregulatory organizations (“SROs”) and the financial firms are also present in Korea today with the promulgation of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (“Capital Markets Act”) which allows Financial Investment Firms (“FIF”금융투자회사) to engage concurrently in multiple financial businesses such as investment banking, trust, asset management, brokerage, sale of investment products, among others. As a result, the need to protect customers of FIFs from losses or damages suffered by conflicts of interest issues has now become greater than ever. The Capital Market Act specifically allows the investors and customers of FIFs to bring an action against the FIFs to seek compensation for damages suffered as a result of conflicts of interest not resolved by the FIF. The Capital Markets Act required the FIFs to adopt and implement Chinese Wall policies and procedures by May, 2009. Chinese Wall policies and procedures adopted by Korean FIFs largely as a result of the industry’s effort to formulate an industry standard are quite different from the Chinese Wall practiced by global financial firms. The main purpose of this paper is to juxtapose and highlight the important features of the different Chinese Wall policies and procedures adopted and implemented by the global financial firms on the one hand and the Korean FIFs on the other hand so as to enable the readers to understand the main similarities and differences, as well as strengths and weaknesses, between the two different Chinese Wall systems
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