지식재산권에 대한 실시료의 수준과 경쟁법의 역할
Royalty Rates for Intellectual Property Rights and the Role of Antitrust Law
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초록
이 논문에서는 최근 개정된 공정거래위원회의 「지식재산권의 부당한 행사에 대한심사지침」중에서, 과다한 실시료를 규제하려는 의도로 포함된 두 개의 조항에 대하여 비판적 검토를 수행하였다. 먼저, 현저히 불합리한 수준의 실시료를 부과하는 행위를 규제하는 ‘III. 1. 가. (2)’ 항은 단기적 경쟁촉진보다는 동태적 혁신을 추구하는 지식재산권법과의 상충 가능성, 실시료 수준을 판단하기 위한 객관적 방법론의 부재 등을 감안할 때 상당한 문제점을 안고 있음을 제시하였다. 다음으로, 표준으로 이용되는 특허 발명에 특정하여 비합리적인 수준의 실시료를 부과하는 행위를 규제하는 ‘III. 3. 라’ 항의 경우, 표준 설정 과정에서 나타나는 복잡한 변화들이 경쟁에 미칠 수 있는 영향에 대한 신중한 분석이 결여된 것으로 판단된다. 또한, 경쟁법적 규제의 근거로 삼기에도 부적합하고 준수 여부를 판단할 수 있는 객관적, 구체적 방법론도 존재하지 않는 FRAND의 이행 여부를 법위반 판단 기준으로 삼으려 하는 문제를 갖고 있다. 이러한 분석 결과들을 바탕으로, 본 논문에서는 두 조항을 폐지하거나, 적어도 구체적이고, 명확하며, 보편적으로 수용 가능한 적용기준을 수립할 것을 대안으로 제시한다.
Abstract
This paper presents a critical analysis of two provisions of the Guidelines on the Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights, recently amended by the Korea Fair Trade Commission to regulate the excessive royalty. First, Article III.1.A. (2), which prohibits an act of charging remarkably unreasonable level of royalty, has many problems, given that it is not only contradicts the purpose of the intellectual property law which aims to foster dynamic innovation, but there is no objective methodology to determine the appropriate level of royalty. Next, Article III.3.D., which regulates an act of charging unreasonable level of royalty for the patents included in technical standards, also presents various problems; It lacks prudent analysis of the impact on the competition by complicated variations emerging from the standardization process; It adopts FRAND terms as a judgment standard to determine illegality, but FRAND is not deemed appropriate legal base, and there is no objective and concrete methodology to determine the observance. As a result, this paper proposes an alternative, which is either to abolish these two provisions or to establish a new applicable standard which is concrete, clear and commonly acceptable.
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