증권집단소송에서의 대표원고(Lead Plaintiff)에 관한 연구-미국의 증권민사소송개혁법을 중심으로
A Study on the Lead Plaintiff in the Securities Class Action
0
조회
0
다운로드
3
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
Abstract
Lead plaintiff in securities class action must be the member or members of the class whom court determine to be most capable of adequately representing the interest of class members. Securities Class Action Act provides that the most adequate lead plaintiff is the person or group of persons that (1)has the largest financial interest and (2)represent the class fairy and adequately. So in this article I have analized three factors for the requirement to be selected as lead plaintiff; Largest Interest, Typicallity, Adequacy. These requirements are originated from PSLRA and desicions in US courts will help our interpretation of Securities Class Action Act. In determing Largest Interest there is a difference of opinion as to whether parties may aggregate their losses for the purpose of the lead plaintiff determination. The Typicality is satisfied when a plaintiffꡑs injury arises from or is directly related to a wrong includes the wrong to the plaintiff. To meet Adequacy, plaintiff must meet two basic condition; (1)they must not have interest that are adverse to those of class (2)plaintiffꡑs counsel must be qualified. Some plaintiffs who seek as lead plaintiffs in securities class action are institutional investors and US courts have recognized that the ability of an institutional investor to represent a class is consistent with PSLRA. Under Securities Class Action Act multiple plaintiff is permissible. But it is not clear under PSLRA and there are arguments for the possibility of multiple plaintiff. In securities class action, the related issues of the selection of lead plaintiff and the selectin of lead plaintiff are decided concurrently. There are not express provision in Securities Class Action Act states that lead plaintiff select counsel to represent class. But it will be general and Act provides that courts have the authority to direct the counsel.
참고문헌 (14)
- "미국의 증권규제" (2001), 홍문사
- "미국증권관계법" (2001), 박영사
- "미국의 증권집단소송의 현황에 관한 소고", 12 (2003)
- "증권집단소송(Securities Class Action)의 도입필요성에 관한 연구", 10(1) (2003)
- "미국 증권집단소송에서의 면책범위(safe harbor)", 20(4) (2002)
- "The Law of Securities Regulation" (2002)
- "S Wrong with the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements? A Call to the Whatꡑ;S Wrong with the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements? A Call to the Securities and Exchange Commission to reconsider Codification of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine" (1997)
- "Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Whatꡑs safe and whatꡑs not?," (2000)
- "Aggregation, Auctions, and other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel under the PSLRA" (2001)
- "Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as sole Lead Plaintiffs under the PSLRA" (1999)
- "The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors in Securities Litigation" (2001)
- "In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action Plaintiffsꡑ Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel" (1999)
- "And The Winner is ? Interpreting the Lead Plaintiff and the Lead Counsel Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995" (2002)
- "Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging" (2003)
