하버마스의 담론윤리적 보편주의

Abstract

This paper aims to examine Habermas's proceduralist universalism which based on discourse ethics and communicative act. I concentrate on some tasks which give shape to Habermas's discourse-ethical universalism and I examine certain problems it raises. Consistent with this, in PartⅠ, I briefly illuminate some of general features of Habermas's discourse ethics and proceduralist universalism. In PartⅡ, I examine Habermas's moral universalism which argues the priority of justice over the good. In PartⅢ, I explain Habermas's discourse- theoretical justification of law. In PartⅣ, I take a close look at Habermas's proceduralist approach to law which aims at establishing an internal connection between popular sovereignty and human rights. Finally, in Part Ⅴ, I conclude that Habermas's proceduralist approach to law generates a powerful argument for a model of democracy in which the public and private autonomy of citizens are given equal consideration. It also offers a strong argument for deliberative politics which based on mutual respect, and a appropriate argument for the democratical Rechtsstaat on the basis of an intersubjective account of basic rights and a procedural democracy. And Habermas's discourse-theoretical approach to law can play an important constructive role in determining the normative legitimacy of contemporary law. Finally, I argue, in accordance with Taylor, that ideally relevant differences of minority to majority must be taken into consideration as reasons for recognition of their rights of particularity. In other words, I think that Habermas needs to accept Taylor's ‘ethics of recognition’, in order to compensate for shortcomings of his universalism which based on discourse ethics.