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The Approach of Chinese Courts on SEPs/FRAND Disputes: Convergency or Divergency?

马乐
한국법제연구원 (Korea Legislation Research Institute)|2022.11|Korea Legislation Research Institute Journal of Law and Legislation|제12권 제2호|pp. 95-132|DOI 10.22851/kjll.2022.12.2.003

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참고문헌

키워드

Abuse of RightsInjunctionStandard Essential Patents (SEPs)Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND)
주제분류법학

초록

In an effort to well resolve Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) licensing disputes, particularly raised by Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) commitment, China, after the Huawei/IDC case, has resorted to clarifying patent law by judicial interpretations of Supreme People’s Court, promulgating judicial policy by trial guidelines of higher people’s courts as well as making institutional adjustments by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to request the SEPs litigations appealed to SPC only after the first trial. These endeavors are assumed to have the SEPs disputed resolved with certainty, predictability and consistency. However, whether these will result in convergency or divergency of judicial rules is yet to be proved. Despite the introduction of article 20 in the revised Patent Law adopted in 2020, the uncertainty as a result of applying good faith in the judicial process still needs to be addressed. Other than the CJEU Huawei/ZTE choreography, the stratified analysis of abuse of rights based on relevantly differentiate legal basis by courts of Japan and South Korea is worth noting. The first sentence of article 20 of Chinese Patent Law is more like an advocacy of importance of good faith rather than a specific rule with enforceability, while the last sentence as resorting to anti-monopoly law that needs to be self-restrictive and prudential still contains ambiguities in terms of the revising provisions by State Administration for Market Regulation. Given that, applying abuse of patent right as a buffer zone may be a way out. Despite new practice as deciding global licensing rate and issuing anti-suit injunctions (ASI) among others in recent cases, the approach of tackling issues of FRAND rate, injunctive relief as well as abuse of dominant market position is the main task for China to improve its judicial rules to make itself a favored venue of SEPs litigation globally.

Abstract

In an effort to well resolve Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) licensing disputes, particularly raised by Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) commitment, China, after the Huawei/IDC case, has resorted to clarifying patent law by judicial interpretations of Supreme People’s Court, promulgating judicial policy by trial guidelines of higher people’s courts as well as making institutional adjustments by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to request the SEPs litigations appealed to SPC only after the first trial. These endeavors are assumed to have the SEPs disputed resolved with certainty, predictability and consistency. However, whether these will result in convergency or divergency of judicial rules is yet to be proved. Despite the introduction of article 20 in the revised Patent Law adopted in 2020, the uncertainty as a result of applying good faith in the judicial process still needs to be addressed. Other than the CJEU Huawei/ZTE choreography, the stratified analysis of abuse of rights based on relevantly differentiate legal basis by courts of Japan and South Korea is worth noting. The first sentence of article 20 of Chinese Patent Law is more like an advocacy of importance of good faith rather than a specific rule with enforceability, while the last sentence as resorting to anti-monopoly law that needs to be self-restrictive and prudential still contains ambiguities in terms of the revising provisions by State Administration for Market Regulation. Given that, applying abuse of patent right as a buffer zone may be a way out. Despite new practice as deciding global licensing rate and issuing anti-suit injunctions (ASI) among others in recent cases, the approach of tackling issues of FRAND rate, injunctive relief as well as abuse of dominant market position is the main task for China to improve its judicial rules to make itself a favored venue of SEPs litigation globally.

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관련 논문AI추천

Injunctive Relief in SEP Litigation: The Consideration of Innovation and CompetitionGeng Bang, 吕明瑜동북아법연구소 · 동북아법연구2020 · 제13권 제3호유럽 내 표준필수특허권자의 침해금지청구권 행사에 대한 제한 - 유럽사법재판소의 화웨이 v. ZTE 판결을 중심으로박현경IT와 법연구소 · IT와 법연구2017 · 제14호A Review of Korean Competition Law and Guidelines for Exercise of Standard-related Patents홍대식아시아태평양법연구소 · Journal of Korean Law2015 · 제15권 제1호FRAND 확약 특허권자의 자발적 실시자에 대한 금지청구권의 행사와 독점규제법 위반 책임오승한한국경쟁법학회 · 경쟁법연구2014 · 제29권 FRAND 확약 위반과 표준특허권 침해금지청구— 최근의 국제적 동향을 중심으로 —이문지한국경영법률학회 · 경영법률2014 · 제25권 제1호Competition Law and Policy on Issues Relating to Standard Essential Patents최요섭법학연구원 · 법학논총2017 · 제30권 제2호

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