상키야와 불교의 ‘adhyavasāya’

Abstract

This work contemplates to compare with the concept of adhyavasāya in the comment of Sākhyakārikā (SK) 5 in Yuktidīpikā (YD) and the concept in Nyāyabinduṭīkā (NBṬ). The terminology, adhyavasāya in the definition of pratyakṣa in SK 5 is the determined to the object in the level of perception, and it relies on buddhi. On the other hand, adhyavasāya in NBṬ is the determined to the object in the level of the conceptual construction, and it comes up following pratyakṣa. Therefore, adhyavasāya of YD is the determined having the sense organ as its immediate cause, while adhyavasāya of NBṬ is the determined having recollection as its direct cause. In the case of NBṬ’s adhyavasāya is regarded as the saṃyajjñāna, though it is not pramāṇa, in terms that the word makes to arrive at the purpose to achieve the object. Meanwhile, grāhaka in NBṬ is the determined to ascertain sārūpya in the level of perception. Grāhaka can read as the ascertainment of the object rising up by awakening vāsana, so adhyavasāya in YD has a similar epistemological structure to grāhaka in NBṬ in that cetanāśakti being subordinated to puruṣa, has an effect to the object of adhyavasāya in YD when adhyavasāya determines the object. In other words, there is something in common between the cetanāśakti of puruṣa and the awakened of vāsana in terms that both of the overriding causes to each determined. Moreover, the paper compares the uselessness of buddhi from the view of Buddhist epistemology with the practical value of buddhi from the view of Sāṃkhya in the context on the examination in regard of the role of buddhi in pleasure etc., referring in Pramāṇavārttika. The final pointing out in this paper is that the understanding of adhyavasāya is located as a primary cause for Buddhist epistemology to insist the doctrine of svasaṃvitti, and for Sāṃkhya to assert the doctrine of the difference between pramāṇa and its phala.