발전소 프로젝트 파이낸싱 비재무적 계약조건이 자본구조에 미치는 효과 분석
The impacts of the optimal non-financial contractual structure on the leverage ratio in power plant project finance
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초록
본 연구는 1995~2017년 동안 전 세계 재생에너지 발전소와 화석에너지 발전소 프로젝트 금융 트랜치 3,766건에 관해 프로젝트의 비재무적 계약 구조가 특별목적법인(SPC)의 레버리지 비율에 미치는 효과를 분석하였다. 본 연구의 주요 발견은 다음과 같다. 최종생산물구매계약의 체결은 특별목적법인의 레버리지 비율을 유의적으로 높이나, 주로 투자등급의 사업소재국의 재생에너지 발전 사업에서 크게 나타났다. 최종생산물계약을 사업자가 체결한 경우 오히려 사업 건전성이 낮아져서 레버리지 비율을 낮추었다. 종합적으로, 비재무적 계약이 자본구조에 미치는 영향은 발전소 사업 유형과 사업소재국 신용등급에 따라 다른 양상을 띠는 것으로 분석되었다.
Abstract
We study the optimal policy of the contractual arrangement in raising the debt-to-equity ratio for renewable power and coal power project finance deals. We investigate the impact of the optimal non-financial contractual relationship between counterparties on the soundness of projects, differing in plant type and country risk. Key findings are: first, the existence of off-taking contracts generally raises the debt-to-equity ratio, while off-taking sponsors do not. In deed, the finding is more prominent in the renewable power projects in countries with investment grade. Overall, patterns of the optimal structure of non-financial contract vary with project type and country risk.
참고문헌 (16)
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