Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc. 판례에 관한 분석
Analysis of the Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc Case
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In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court of the United States held that primary liability under Section10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not extend to the conduct of secondary actors who participate in deceptive business transactions, despite the fact that these transactions are intended to deceiving investors. The disputes between the pro and cons of the scheme liability are primarily due to the United States' Tort laws which does not admit aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud. In the Republic of Korea's legal system, however, the counter part of the United States' Tort law provides aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud. Therefore, not only the primary violator but also the secondary participator could be liable under the Korean counter part of the United States' rule 10b-5. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea reduced the burden of poof to insist such liability. The author, in spite of some preceding researches which proposed to enact on the order of United States' scheme liability, suggests that the United States' debates on scheme liability or the Stoneridge case have not so much importance to the Korea, even though the Korean "Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act" provides the exactly same provision of the United States' Securities Exchange Act, rule 10b-5. Also, the author by introducing and analyzing recent Korean Supreme Court' case on the issue, shows how the Korean current laws deal with the aiding and abetting liability of secondary actors without the scheme liability.
Abstract
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court of the United States held that primary liability under Section10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not extend to the conduct of secondary actors who participate in deceptive business transactions, despite the fact that these transactions are intended to deceiving investors. The disputes between the pro and cons of the scheme liability are primarily due to the United States' Tort laws which does not admit aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud. In the Republic of Korea's legal system, however, the counter part of the United States' Tort law provides aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud. Therefore, not only the primary violator but also the secondary participator could be liable under the Korean counter part of the United States' rule 10b-5. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea reduced the burden of poof to insist such liability. The author, in spite of some preceding researches which proposed to enact on the order of United States' scheme liability, suggests that the United States' debates on scheme liability or the Stoneridge case have not so much importance to the Korea, even though the Korean "Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act" provides the exactly same provision of the United States' Securities Exchange Act, rule 10b-5. Also, the author by introducing and analyzing recent Korean Supreme Court' case on the issue, shows how the Korean current laws deal with the aiding and abetting liability of secondary actors without the scheme liability.
참고문헌 (17)
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