Price Discrimination with Loss Averse and Horizontally Differentiated Consumers
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This paper considers a monopolist seller facing horizontally differentiated consumers, whose preferences are reference-dependent and loss averse in the frame of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). Our results on optimal menu suggest that consumer loss aversion does not necessarily limit the benefits of screening under the horizontal demand structure, in contrast to the findings of Hahn, Kim, Kim and Lee (2018) and Herweg and Mierendorff (2013) who consider the case of vertically differentiated preferences.
Abstract
This paper considers a monopolist seller facing horizontally differentiated consumers, whose preferences are reference-dependent and loss averse in the frame of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). Our results on optimal menu suggest that consumer loss aversion does not necessarily limit the benefits of screening under the horizontal demand structure, in contrast to the findings of Hahn, Kim, Kim and Lee (2018) and Herweg and Mierendorff (2013) who consider the case of vertically differentiated preferences.
참고문헌 (6)
- Hahn, J-H., "Price Discrimination with Loss Averse Consumers", Economic Theory, 65, pp.681~728 (2018)
- Herweg, F., "Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss Aversion, and Flat-Rate Tariffs", Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, pp.399~432 (2013)
- Jihong Lee, "Firm Behavior under Consumer Loss Aversion", Seoul Journal of Economics, 27(2), pp.171~186 (2014), 경제연구소[DOI]
- Kőszegi, B., "Behavioral Contract Theory", Journal of Economic Literature, 52, pp.1075~1118 (2014)
- Kőszegi, B., "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, pp.1133~1165 (2006)
- Mussa, M., "Monopoly and Product Quality", Journal of Economic Theory, 18, pp.301~317 (1978)