논문KCI 등재
Precaution, Cleanup and Liability: A Model of Environmentally Harmful, Discharges
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참고문헌
주제분류경제학
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Abstract
We provide a game theoretic model to examine how liability or sanction of cleanup affects the potential contaminator's ex ante incentive to take precaution against environmentally harmful discharge and ex post incentive to clean them up. We show that the liability rule is socially more desirable than the property rule (sanction of cleanup), mainly because the latter has the negative effect on the incentive for voluntary cleanup. We also show that punitive damages induce more cleanup and a higher level of precaution.
참고문헌 (7)
- Becker, "” Journal of Political Economy", pp.169~217 (1968)
- Cohen, "“Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard ” Journal of Law and Econ", pp.23~51 (1987)
- Cohen, "“The Costs and Benefits of Oil Spill Prevention and Enforcement ” Journal of Environmental Econ", pp.167~188 (1986)
- Epple, "” Journal of Law and Econ", pp.29~60 (1984)
- Polinsky, "“A Note on Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges ” Research in Law and Economics", pp.17~24 (1993)
- Segerson, "“Liability for Groundwater Contamination from Pesticides ” Journal of Environmental Econ", pp.227~243 (1990)
- Segerson, "“Risk and Incentives in the Financing of Hazardous Waste Cleanup ” Journal of Environmental Econ", pp.1~8 (1989)
관련 논문AI추천
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