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Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior

정세은|Radu Vranceanu
한국경제학회 (The Korean Economic Association)|2017.06|The Korean Economic Review|제33권 제1호|pp. 95-126|DOI 10.22841/kerdoi.2017.33.1.004

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키워드

GenderPerformanceDiscriminationPunishmentReal-effort taskTeam production
주제분류경제학

초록

This paper reports the results from an experiment where men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a counting task. An individual’s payoff is proportional to the joint production of right answers. Participants who perform better than their partner in the task can punish him or her by imposing a fine. We manipulate the pairs’ gender compositions to analyze whether an individual’s performance and sanctioning behavior depend on his or her gender and the gender of his or her partner, which is revealed to the subjects at the beginning of the experiment. The data show that, conditional on underperformance, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; however, if they are sanctioned, men tend to improve their performances, while women’s performances do not change

Abstract

This paper reports the results from an experiment where men and women are paired to form a two-member team and asked to execute a counting task. An individual’s payoff is proportional to the joint production of right answers. Participants who perform better than their partner in the task can punish him or her by imposing a fine. We manipulate the pairs’ gender compositions to analyze whether an individual’s performance and sanctioning behavior depend on his or her gender and the gender of his or her partner, which is revealed to the subjects at the beginning of the experiment. The data show that, conditional on underperformance, women are sanctioned more often and more heavily than men; however, if they are sanctioned, men tend to improve their performances, while women’s performances do not change

참고문헌 (47)

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