도덕 경험론의 욕망과 도덕규범의 문제

Abstract

This article argues that moral empiricism has a definite disadvantage compared to moral rationalism. The former argues, by focusing on moral agents’ behavior such as desires and wants, that it can explain away the nature of moral norms and structure through an epistemic analysis. In contrast, moral rationalism holds that moral norms and structure can be constructed or analyzed by universal or theoretical reason. Moral empiricists deny the function of reason in this matter. The author examines John Mackie and Peter Railton, both of whom can represent moral empiricism, to show that moral empiricism's argument is unjustified. The empirical analysis as theirs confirms and relies only on the existence of given moral convention, rather than illustrating how the convention can be formed or changed. The reason for this difficulty comes from the inadequacy of empiricists’ tools that are wants, desires, and instrumental reason. These can be meaningful only within the range of given moral convention, so the tools cannot be applied beyond what lies beyond the range-- that is, the examination of how the moral norms and structure are made. This examination is not an empirical research, so that it can be dealt only by transcendental reason. Meanwhile moral rationalism can accommodate instrumental reason or desire--major weapons wielded by moral empiricism. That is, moral rationalism admits that average moral agents can be motivated by wants and desires, or by instrumental reason. But wants and desires are not consistent at all, and conflictive with each other, so that moral norms and system can be constructed only by rational thinking. Then moral agents can internalize moral norms and maintain moral life with the trust in the given moral system--so-called moral convention. This epistemic explanation or description on this moral behavior can be a contribution from moral empiricism, but it cannot be said, the author argues, that the explanation is solely right.