Labor Search Cost and Labor Magnaged Firms
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Labor managed firms typically require workers to invest capital and labor in a single venture. This will largely constrain the number of workers who are willing to and able to work in labor managed firms. Therefore, the labor search cost in labor managed firms would be higher than that of capital managed firms counterparts. As the number of workers increase the search cost will increase, and on the other hand, the agency problem advantage of labor managed firms would be diluted. The economic model introduced in this paper is founded on this simple idea. Using this framework, we show how variables such as number of workers, capital intensity, homogeneity of workers, labor turn-over ratio and riskiness can affect the emergence of labor managed firms. We also show why labor managed firms are often found to be more productive and when employee buy-out may occur.
Abstract
Labor managed firms typically require workers to invest capital and labor in a single venture. This will largely constrain the number of workers who are willing to and able to work in labor managed firms. Therefore, the labor search cost in labor managed firms would be higher than that of capital managed firms counterparts. As the number of workers increase the search cost will increase, and on the other hand, the agency problem advantage of labor managed firms would be diluted. The economic model introduced in this paper is founded on this simple idea. Using this framework, we show how variables such as number of workers, capital intensity, homogeneity of workers, labor turn-over ratio and riskiness can affect the emergence of labor managed firms. We also show why labor managed firms are often found to be more productive and when employee buy-out may occur.
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