방어적 특허풀 구성과 부속약정에 대한 경쟁제한성 평가 -중소기업체의 방어적 특허풀을 중심으로-

Abstract

Patent pool, in which secondary patent owners in some manner have combined their patents, could be used as a tool to defense their interest and demand license from huge original patent proprietors dominating original technology market. The patent pools, however, might have one common characteristic of illegal cartel because two or more patent owners mutually agree to same license condition and royalty, and moreover to prohibit their members' individual license with the third party out of the pool. Multiple scholars have generally insisted that especially the pools composed of pure substitute patents competing with each other are more likely to infringe competition in the technology market. Nevertheless, the pools composed only of complementary patents or even pure substitute patents under exceptional conditions may increase efficiencies and lower prices to consumers. The Patent pool composed of secondary patent owners can resist dominating market power by gigantic patent owners preoccupying original essential patents and make royalty lower than before. As a result, the defending patent pool against the original patent proprietors can contribute to increasing social welfare because their behavior can lead to lower price of the final product or service.