THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
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One of the purposes behind the Clinton administration’s engagement policy toward North Korea has been to help bring the Pyongyang regime out of its shell and into contact with the larger world. The creation of the proposed economic community could make it easier for the United States to fulfill these objectives. It also would facilitate the United States’ manifest desires to aid the Kim Dae-jung government’s efforts to achieve an incremental economic convergence between the two Koreas and avoid a hard landing. Regardless of whether the United States is led by a President Gore or a President Bush, there are some other cautionary factors worth noting with respect to prospective U.S. policy toward President Kim’s proposed economic community. In terms of basic U.S. national interests with regard to the Korean peninsula one can legitimately question whether the United States would be better served by pursuing relationships with two coexisting Korean economies or by facilitating Korean economic convergence. Despite reasons for U.S. caution, the desire on the part of an overwhelming majority of American foreign affairs experts to avoid doing anything which could reduce strong U.S. influence in key regions of the world is likely to predispose Washington toward active support for the Korean economic community as a means to perpetuate American influence in and around Korea and to impede the growth of other countries’ influence over Korea.
Abstract
One of the purposes behind the Clinton administration’s engagement policy toward North Korea has been to help bring the Pyongyang regime out of its shell and into contact with the larger world. The creation of the proposed economic community could make it easier for the United States to fulfill these objectives. It also would facilitate the United States’ manifest desires to aid the Kim Dae-jung government’s efforts to achieve an incremental economic convergence between the two Koreas and avoid a hard landing. Regardless of whether the United States is led by a President Gore or a President Bush, there are some other cautionary factors worth noting with respect to prospective U.S. policy toward President Kim’s proposed economic community. In terms of basic U.S. national interests with regard to the Korean peninsula one can legitimately question whether the United States would be better served by pursuing relationships with two coexisting Korean economies or by facilitating Korean economic convergence. Despite reasons for U.S. caution, the desire on the part of an overwhelming majority of American foreign affairs experts to avoid doing anything which could reduce strong U.S. influence in key regions of the world is likely to predispose Washington toward active support for the Korean economic community as a means to perpetuate American influence in and around Korea and to impede the growth of other countries’ influence over Korea.