DEALING WITH NORTH KOREA: FROM BILATERALISM TO MULTILATERALISM
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Conventional international relations wisdom suggests that bilateral and multilateral security institutions are mutually exclusive. In anarchic security environments, as smaller allies try to bind and balance more powerful allies in cooperation with other lesser ones, powerful nations resist multilateral institutions because they constrain their freedom of action. Thus, it is argued that the United States has preferred bilateral security alliances in East Asia rather than multilateral structures to address its security concerns in the region. Yet, in the last decade Washington has increasingly come to favor multilateral fora such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). To understand this rise of multilateralism and to evaluate its prospects on Korean peninsula, this article analyses the Bush administration’s North Korea policy as well as biand multilateral arrangements dealing with two crucial security problems: the North Korean ballistic missile program and Pyongyang’s Nuclear program. The article concludes by suggesting that bilateral alliances can be and indeed are reinforcing multilateral security arrangements and vice versa.
Abstract
Conventional international relations wisdom suggests that bilateral and multilateral security institutions are mutually exclusive. In anarchic security environments, as smaller allies try to bind and balance more powerful allies in cooperation with other lesser ones, powerful nations resist multilateral institutions because they constrain their freedom of action. Thus, it is argued that the United States has preferred bilateral security alliances in East Asia rather than multilateral structures to address its security concerns in the region. Yet, in the last decade Washington has increasingly come to favor multilateral fora such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). To understand this rise of multilateralism and to evaluate its prospects on Korean peninsula, this article analyses the Bush administration’s North Korea policy as well as biand multilateral arrangements dealing with two crucial security problems: the North Korean ballistic missile program and Pyongyang’s Nuclear program. The article concludes by suggesting that bilateral alliances can be and indeed are reinforcing multilateral security arrangements and vice versa.