다르마끼르띠의 타학파 인식수단 비판 - 『쁘라마나비니쉬짜야』 「현량장」을 중심으로 -

Abstract

Praṃāṇaviniścaya by Dharmakīrti is an independent treatise that summarizes his major work, the vast volume of Praṃāṇaviniścaya. This paper deals with his criticism of the cognition means of other schools, focusing on verse 1to 3and its commentary of the chapterⅠ in the PVin. Each school of thought in India had different means of cognition that they recognized. In the Buddhist epistemological tradition, only perception and inference are recognized as valid cognitive means. In the first chapter perception of PVin, Dharmakīrti argues that perception and inference are only the correct means of cognition through criticism of the other schools' means of cognition." The 'perception chapter' of PVin specifically deals with four cognition means of the other schools. The criticisms of the means of cognition dealt with in the perception chapter are made in two ways. First, in addition to perception and inference, he argues whether śabda, yukti and anupalabdhi presented by the opponent schools are valid as an independent means of recognition. Second, Dharmakīrti points out the three contradictions that arise when the materialist Cārvāka acknowledges only perception as a means of cognition, and emphasizes the need for inference as correct means of cognition. Finally, Dharmakīrti explains that when there is svabhāva- pratibandha between the hetu and sādhya in inference, inference becomes a correct means of cognition without deception, alongside perception. Dharmakīrti firmly asserts, through a critical examination of the means of cognition of other schools, that there are no other means of cognition apart from perception and inference.