시리아 국내갈등 해결전망
The Prospect of Syrian Internal Conflict Resolution
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Neither al-Assad nor his enemies can hope to win an outright victory. By continuing to fight, they are simply exhausting themselves and ruining their country. Either the antagonists will persist in their life-and-death struggle, or they will decide to seek some sort of a compromise, which could save their country from possible partition. The longer that Syria’s domestic war goes on, the more fragmented the country becomes; this trajectory is accompanied by three other dangerous trends: sectarianism increasingly will become the option of choice for Syrian citizens who seek security but cannot get it from the state; revenge killings will become a more likely occurrence after Assad; and, militant Salafists will increasingly take root in local communities across the country as they prove to be well-organized and funded adversaries of the Assad regime. In Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere, the will to overthrow President al-Assad is still there. But there is beginning to be some hesitation in helping the opposition destroy the Syrian regime. “Military intervention will not end Syria's humanitarian nightmare. It will only change its composition both the Assad government and the rebel forces have reacted coolly, if not with hostility, to the proposals that there be talks under the joint patronage of the United States and Russia. The only solution is to seek Russia's and China's support for U.N.-sponsored elections in which, with luck, Assad might be ‘persuaded’ not to participate.”For peace to return to Syria, some reconfiguring of power relationships between its different communities will evidently be necessary. The intelligence services and officer corps, dominated by Alawis over the past several decades, will need to be restructured so as to give moderate Muslims a greater share of power. External powers, Arab and non-Arab, will need to put their ambitions and rivalries aside and join forces in presiding over a Syrian settlement, which will keep fanatics of all communities at bay. Ancient minorities will need to be protected. The more than one million Syrian refugees that have fled the country will need to be brought home and rehoused. Massive financial aid, very probably from oil and gas-rich Gulf States, will need to be provided to rebuild Syria’s shattered towns and villages. The timing and nature of the transition to a new governance system in Syria remain highly speculative. I personally expected the Assad regime to have fallen by now, but clearly its staying power is great. The weakness and lack of unity of the opposition forces make it impossible to predict a post-Assad scenario. More and more an alysts expect chaos, violence, sectarian revenge killings and deep fragmentation to occur, and these become more likely with every passing month of fighting.
Abstract
Neither al-Assad nor his enemies can hope to win an outright victory. By continuing to fight, they are simply exhausting themselves and ruining their country. Either the antagonists will persist in their life-and-death struggle, or they will decide to seek some sort of a compromise, which could save their country from possible partition. The longer that Syria’s domestic war goes on, the more fragmented the country becomes; this trajectory is accompanied by three other dangerous trends: sectarianism increasingly will become the option of choice for Syrian citizens who seek security but cannot get it from the state; revenge killings will become a more likely occurrence after Assad; and, militant Salafists will increasingly take root in local communities across the country as they prove to be well-organized and funded adversaries of the Assad regime. In Washington, London, Paris and elsewhere, the will to overthrow President al-Assad is still there. But there is beginning to be some hesitation in helping the opposition destroy the Syrian regime. “Military intervention will not end Syria's humanitarian nightmare. It will only change its composition both the Assad government and the rebel forces have reacted coolly, if not with hostility, to the proposals that there be talks under the joint patronage of the United States and Russia. The only solution is to seek Russia's and China's support for U.N.-sponsored elections in which, with luck, Assad might be ‘persuaded’ not to participate.”For peace to return to Syria, some reconfiguring of power relationships between its different communities will evidently be necessary. The intelligence services and officer corps, dominated by Alawis over the past several decades, will need to be restructured so as to give moderate Muslims a greater share of power. External powers, Arab and non-Arab, will need to put their ambitions and rivalries aside and join forces in presiding over a Syrian settlement, which will keep fanatics of all communities at bay. Ancient minorities will need to be protected. The more than one million Syrian refugees that have fled the country will need to be brought home and rehoused. Massive financial aid, very probably from oil and gas-rich Gulf States, will need to be provided to rebuild Syria’s shattered towns and villages. The timing and nature of the transition to a new governance system in Syria remain highly speculative. I personally expected the Assad regime to have fallen by now, but clearly its staying power is great. The weakness and lack of unity of the opposition forces make it impossible to predict a post-Assad scenario. More and more an alysts expect chaos, violence, sectarian revenge killings and deep fragmentation to occur, and these become more likely with every passing month of fighting.
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