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사외이사후보추천위원회의 자발적 도입에 영향을 미치는 요인 연구 : 대리인 비용과 감시유인을 중심으로

A Study on the Determinants of Voluntary Formation of Nominating Committee : Focusing on Agency Costs and Monitoring Incentives

정갑수|이상철|이치웅
한국공인회계사회 (THE KOREAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS)|2013.06|회계ㆍ세무와 감사 연구 (Study on Accounting, Taxation & Auditing)|제55권 제1호|pp. 1-27|DOI 10.22781/kicpa.2013.55.1.1

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참고문헌

키워드

사외이사후보추천위원회agency costs대리인비용감시유인monitoring incentive자발적 도입nominating committeevoluntary formation
주제분류회계학

초록

본 연구에서는 대리인문제를 주주와 전문경영자 사이의 관계, 채권자와 주주 사이의 관계, 그리고 소액주주와 지배주주 사이의 관계로 구분하여 사외이사후보추천위원회의 자발적 수요에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 또한 이사회의 경영자에 대한 감시유인으로 이사회의 사외이사비율을 선정하여, 사외이사후보추천위원회의 자발적 도입에 미치는 영향을 파악하였다. 2001년부터 2009년까지 한국거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 비금융기업 가운데, 사외이사후보추천위원회를 자발적으로 도입한 92개 기업-년 자료를 분석표본으로, 그리고 분석표본과 동일한 연도 및 산업에 속하며 자산규모가 유사한 사외이사후보추천위원회를 도입하지 않은 92개 기업-년 자료를 통제표본으로 선정하여, 모두 184개 기업-년 자료를 분석에 사용하였다. 분석결과, 소액주주와 지배주주 사이의 대리인문제가 커질수록 사외이사후보추천위원회를 자발적으로 도입할 가능성이 커짐을 알 수 있다. 또한 경영자를 감시하는 이사회의 독립성이 높아질수록 사외이사후보추천위원회에 대한 자발적 수요가 커질 수 있음을 나타낸다. 그리고 이사회규모가 큰 경우에 이사회의 하부위원회로 사외이사후보추천위원회를 구성할 수 있음을 알 수 있었다. 본 연구결과는 사외이사후보추천위원회를 효과적으로 도입하기 위한 요건을 파악하는데 도움을 줄 수 있다. 현재의 기업규모 기준이외에 사외이사후보추천위원회를 도입하는데 필요한 요건을 파악함으로써, 사외이사후보추천위원회의 유효성을 확보하기 위한 규제당국의 정책 수립에 유용한 지침을 제공할 수 있다.

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate what factors influence voluntary nominating committee formation, focusing on both agency costs and the proportion of the independent directors on the board of directors. Considering three kinds of agency costs which can occur between owners and managements, between owners and creditors, and between majority and minority stockholders, we examine whether each category of agency costs is associated with voluntary nominating committee formation. We also investigate whether the proportion of the independent directors on the board of directors is associated with voluntary nominating committee formation. We collect non-financing firms data from Korean listed companies for the period 2001-2009. Because Korean listed firms having more than or equal to 2,000 billion won of assets are required to form their nominating committees, this paper focuses on the firms of less than 2,000 billion won of assets. We selected non-financing firms voluntarily forming nominating committees, matched with those not forming nominating committees. The matching criteria used in the paper include year, industry classification and firm size. Our final sample consists of 92 non-financing firm-year data with voluntary nominating committees and 92 firm-year control data without them. In this paper, the dependent variable indicates whether the firm voluntarily adopts its nominating committee or not. We use three measures of the CEO type, the ratio of debt-to-total assets and the Chaebol affiliated firms. We further define monitoring incentives as the proportion of the independent directors on the board of directors. In order to control for other factors with systematic effects on the distribution of the dependent variable, we also add several control variables into the model to test the hypotheses such as firm size and board size. We find that the agency cost between the majority and minority owners is positively associated with the voluntary nominating committee formation. We also find that voluntary nominating committee formation is positively associated with the proportion of the independent directors on the board of directors. The results of this paper help to understand the economic determinants of voluntary formation of nominating committee. Empirical results also suggest several important implications for regulatory bodies on the effective composition of nominating committees.

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