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부당공동행위의 일부 기간에 대한 리니언시(Leniency) - 대법원 2010. 6. 30. 선고 2010두28915 판결 -

A Study on Korea’s Leniency Program in Cartels - Focusing on Partial Leniency

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Cartels cause a market distortion, and have an extremely negative impact on the national economy as well as on firms and consumers. Leniency program was introduced in 1997 as a means of effective cartel detection. According to a study on the economic effects of leniency program, this program has contributed to the deterrence of cartel formation, the increase of the probability of detection, and the decrease in time and costs associated with cartel investigation. However, if participating firms reached successive cartel agreements for different periods of time during the existence of a cartel, whether to recognize a partial leniency for each of these periods can be an issue. For example,suppose that there was a cartel from 2000 to 2010, and firm A had involved in this cartel for the whole ten years but firm B only participated in this cartel from 2000 to 2005 or 2006 to 2010. If firm B is the first leniency applicant and firm A is the second applicant, the issue is whether firm A can have the status of the first applicant for the period that firm B was not the member of the cartel. The Supreme Court has decided on this issue that if firm B is qualified as the first leniency applicant for the entire cartel period, firm A cannot acquire a separate first applicant status for a specific period of time. I think this conclusion is reasonable but there can be other arguments according to the number of cartels or demarcation of the scope of related market. This study will analyze this Supreme Court case and suggest various types of leniency based on the period of cartel to examine whether to allow a separate leniency in each of these types.

Abstract

Cartels cause a market distortion, and have an extremely negative impact on the national economy as well as on firms and consumers. Leniency program was introduced in 1997 as a means of effective cartel detection. According to a study on the economic effects of leniency program, this program has contributed to the deterrence of cartel formation, the increase of the probability of detection, and the decrease in time and costs associated with cartel investigation. However, if participating firms reached successive cartel agreements for different periods of time during the existence of a cartel, whether to recognize a partial leniency for each of these periods can be an issue. For example,suppose that there was a cartel from 2000 to 2010, and firm A had involved in this cartel for the whole ten years but firm B only participated in this cartel from 2000 to 2005 or 2006 to 2010. If firm B is the first leniency applicant and firm A is the second applicant, the issue is whether firm A can have the status of the first applicant for the period that firm B was not the member of the cartel. The Supreme Court has decided on this issue that if firm B is qualified as the first leniency applicant for the entire cartel period, firm A cannot acquire a separate first applicant status for a specific period of time. I think this conclusion is reasonable but there can be other arguments according to the number of cartels or demarcation of the scope of related market. This study will analyze this Supreme Court case and suggest various types of leniency based on the period of cartel to examine whether to allow a separate leniency in each of these types.

참고문헌 (10)

  1. 김두진, "공정거래법상 부당한 공동행위 자진신고자 감면제도", 상사판례연구, 21(1), pp.73~106 (2008), 한국상사판례학회
  2. 김현수, "부당공동행위의 적발유인제도 -자진신고자 감면제도를 중심으로", 경영법률
  3. 손영화, "공정거래법상 리니언시제도에 관한 연구", 기업법연구, 24(2), pp.285~321 (2010), 한국기업법학회
  4. 오행록, "Leniency 제도 집행성과와 향후 과제", 경쟁법연구, 16 (2007)
  5. 정중원, "카르텔 감면제도의 개선과 운용활성화", 경쟁법연구, 12 (2010), 공정거래위원회
  6. Report on leniency programmes to fight hardcore cartel, "OECD", DAFFE, 2001, DAFFE[DOI]
  7. Scott D Hammond, "Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in Corporate Plea Negotiations", Speech at The 54th Annual American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, 29 (2006)
  8. John M. Connor, "A Critique of Partial Leniency for Cartels by the U.S. Department of Justice", Address at the 6th International Industrial Organization Conference, 17 (2008)
  9. Bertus Van Barlingen, "The European Commission’s 2002 Leniency Notice in Practice", Competition Policy Newsletter 2005-3, DG Competition, ~ (2005)
  10. "Summary of Commission Decision of 28 November 2007 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP", 39.165 - Flat Glass), OJ C127, pp.2007, ~

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